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Fixing the Constable’s Blunder:
Can One Trial Judge in One County in One State Nudge
a Nation Beyond the Exclusionary Rule?
H. Mitchell Caldwell ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Exclusionary Rule is like the weather; everybody
talks about it but nobody does anything. Despite the rule’s wholesale
damnation, 1 its disproportionate windfall to the accused, 2 its disregard of
∗ Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I want to acknowledge and
thank Janelle Dine and Andrew Robinson for their spirited and invaluable assistance with this
Article. Additionally, I am grateful to Pepperdine University School of Law for its Summer Grant
Program.
1. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757
(1994). Amar argues,
The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment. Much of what the Supreme Court
has said in the last half century—that the Amendment generally calls for warrants and
probable cause for all searches and seizures, and exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence—is initially plausible but ultimately misguided. As a matter of text, history, and
plain old common sense, these three pillars of modern Fourth Amendment case law are
hard to support; in fact, today’s Supreme Court does not really support them. Except
when it does. Warrants are not required—unless they are. All searches and seizures must
be grounded in probable cause—but not on Tuesdays. And unlawfully seized evidence
must be excluded whenever five votes say so.
Id.
2. See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1565 (1999) (“Perhaps the most wellknown criminal windfall is the exclusionary rule. Under the modern interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, courts must exclude evidence obtained by an illegal search or seizure, regardless of
how probative it may be of the defendant’s guilt” (footnote omitted)); NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA 2 (1982)
[hereinafter NIJ STUDY] (stating that 32.5% of all felony drug arrests cleared for prosecution in 1981
to the Los Angeles County Prosecutor’s Office were denied after an initial review because of
violations to search and seizure requirements, and that about 46% of individuals freed in California
in 1976 and 1977 as a result of the exclusionary rule went on to commit additional crimes within 24
months of their release); see also Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary
Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun’s Call To Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial
Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 50–51 (1994)
(noting that defendants often use the exclusionary rule to make unmerited suppression motions that
can wear down prosecutors and can even prove to be successful and that thus, defendants are
encouraged to make these motions because the slight cost is minimal in comparison to the potential
windfall if the motion proves to be successful).
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probative and often compelling incriminatory evidence, 3 and its wide
variance from the goals that gave rise to its creation, 4 the rule is now in
its forty-fifth year. 5 Even the United States Supreme Court has beaten
and battered 6 the rule out of frustration at its draconian and odious
remedy. And yet, we still only talk about it. Associate Supreme Court
Justice Harry Blackmun talked about the rule in his 1984 concurring
opinion in United States v. Leon:
If a single principle may be drawn from this Court’s exclusionary rule
decisions, from Weeks through Mapp v. Ohio, to the decisions handed
down here today, it is that the scope of the exclusionary rule is subject
to change in light of changing judicial understanding about the effects
of the rule outside the confines of the courtroom. 7

Like the weather—everybody talks about it, but nobody does anything.
The great irony of the American justice system is that we cling to a rule
that we are at best uncertain of and pay a tremendous cost for the
privilege. 8 Small wonder all the talk.
Justice Blackmun prognosticated that the rule is “subject to change
in light of changing judicial understanding about the effects of the rule
outside the confines of the courtroom.” 9 Has our understanding of the
rule’s effects therefore changed? Do we know more now than we did in
1961? 10 Do we know more now than when Blackmun set forth his
3. See NIJ STUDY, supra note 2, at 10, 13. The study suggests that 4.8% of felony arrests
were denied due to violations of search and seizure requirements. Limiting such prosecutions can
preserve scarce financial resources, but suspected criminals are still freed without being charged or
even tried for any offense; thus, the defendant benefits from the exclusionary rule before it is even
applied to any evidence. Id.
4. See infra note 12.
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to criminal cases in
state courts).
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
8. See Christopher Slobogin, Reform: The Police: Testilying: Police Perjury and What To
Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1037–60 (1996) (noting that police perjury in order to
convict the guilty and avoid the consequences of the exclusionary rule has become so common that it
has been named “testilying”). Id. at 1040. Prosecutors and judges often ignore such perjury because
“they probably agree with the police that the end justifies the means.” Id. at 1047. In addition, one
proposal to correct testilying includes eliminating the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1057. See also supra
notes 2–3 and accompanying text for additional costs of the rule.
9. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
10. See infra Part II.C; see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659. The Mapp Court argued that it cannot
“lightly be assumed that, as a practical matter, adoption of the exclusionary rule fetters law
enforcement.” Id. Although the exclusionary rule does restrain law enforcement, the rule, despite its
numerous exceptions, is still far too draconian, often allowing probative evidence to be thrown to the
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remarks in 1984? 11 Do we have a better grasp as to whether the rule
fulfills the very goals for which it was created, most significantly, the
goal of deterring violation of Fourth Amendment rights? 12
We certainly know more now than we used to know. The empirical
research has given us a clearer notion about “the effects of the rule
outside the confines of the courtroom.” 13 And as shall be set forth later
in this Article, we have come to learn that the rule does not accomplish
what it was meant to accomplish because police officers are generally
not deterred by its operation. 14 If, then, our “understanding” has

wayside. Furthermore, as more exceptions are continually being created, the initial perception of the
rule’s “unfettering” effect has become dated. Id.
11. See L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule:
A New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for Civil Administrative
Remedy To Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 678 (1998). Since the decision in
Leon, a number of studies concerning the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule have been
conducted, including the following: William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 311 (1991); Perrin et al., supra; Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search
Warrants, Motions To Suppress and “Lost Cases”: The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven
Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034 (1991); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The
Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1016 (1987). Some studies have praised the exclusionary rule while others have damned it.
But, all of the empirical studies have added further perspective to the exclusionary rule in an effort to
answer whether the rule deters illegal police misconduct. See infra Part II.C.
12. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. The Court in Leon argued that
[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then
evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 919 (quoting U.S. v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 260–61 (1983) (White, J., concurring); United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433, 459 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, at 610–11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring
in part). The Leon Court further contended that
where the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, ‘excluding the evidence will not
further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully
apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in
similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct
unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 919–20 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539–40 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
13. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928; see infra Part II.C.
14. See infra note 148 and accompanying text (stating that police officers occasionally lie in
suppression hearings to avoid exclusion); see infra notes 154–78 and accompanying text for a
summary of two studies that found that police are generally not deterred by the exclusionary rule.
William Heffernan and Richard Lovely’s study found that fifteen percent of 500 surveyed law
enforcement officers would still follow an illegal course of conduct in violation of Fourth
Amendment rights despite being aware of the exclusionary rule. Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 721.
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changed, and we are underwhelmed with the exclusionary rule, is it not
time to heed Justice Blackmun’s call and do something about it?
Most of those engaged in thoughtful reflection about the efficacy of
the exclusionary rule would agree that the rule is far from the effective
remedy first envisioned by the Warren Court in the early sixties. 15 And
there certainly has been no lack of alternatives bandied about in the
literature. 16 Why then does it still remain the primary vehicle for
enforcing the Fourth Amendment? 17 If the devil we know isn’t working,
aren’t we bound to try something else, especially when the devil at play
comes with such tremendous costs? 18
This Article is not meant to be just another academic alternative to
the exclusionary rule that would quickly be relegated to the junkyard of
such proposals, but is meant to be a guideline for actually moving past
the rule. 19 This Essay argues that such movement is justified and that the
state courts are the places to effectuate the change. It goes on to provide
a blueprint for enabling one trial judge in one county in one state court to
institute change and nudge a nation beyond the exclusionary rule.

The 1998 Perrin, Caldwell, and Chase study found that eighteen percent of 1144 law enforcement
officers felt that suppression of evidence was either a minor concern or no concern at all. Id.
15. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (“[W]e can no longer permit [the Fourth Amendment] right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other
basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer, who in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its
enjoyment.”); see also infra Part II.A (explaining the origins and development of the exclusionary
rule).
16. See Caldwell & Chase, supra note 2, at 56–66 (noting that there can be an international
perspective in looking at alternatives to the exclusionary rule because the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand have all taken different approaches in dealing with evidence obtained in
violation of individual rights to privacy); Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 718, 736–43 (listing existing
remedies to the rule as the good faith modification, tort actions, and civil rights, and other proposed
remedies as an extension of the good faith exception and the Canadian tort remedy). Some
additionally suggested alternatives to the rule include “criminal prosecution of the offending officer,
internal discipline of the officer (including termination of employment and steps less than
termination), payment of monetary damages by the officer after a lawsuit, or alternatively, after an
administrative proceeding, and requiring the officer to participate in educational courses.” Id. at 718.
17. Although the Court has repeatedly limited the exclusionary rule’s application, it has kept
the rule so that the Fourth Amendment’s protections do not remain an “empty promise.” Mapp, 367
U.S. at 660. In refusing to abolish the exclusionary rule, the Court has made it clear that the rule’s
primary purpose is to deter and that the rule should only be applied when it will achieve its
deterrence goals. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442–43 (1984); Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
18. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 16.
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In this Article, I will track a hypothetical criminal case from illegal
search and seizure through pretrial motions in which a trial prosecutor
concedes that the fruits of the crime (a methamphetamine lab) were
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The hypothetical
prosecutor maintains that exclusion of the evidence would be
inappropriate both because it would prevent probative evidence from
trial and because it would not further the deterrence goal of the
exclusionary rule. The prosecutor then asserts that since the officer
involved was already sanctioned and reeducated on the requirements of
search and seizure, he will be less likely to err in the future, thus
accomplishing the goal of the exclusionary rule in deterring the officer
from future violations and negating the need to exclude the fruits of the
illegal search. 20
The bulk of this Article will involve two exchanges. The first
exchange involves the prosecutor, defense counsel, and trial judge at a
pretrial suppression hearing during which the prosecutor succeeds in
convincing the court that the exclusion of the evidence is not warranted
in light of the remedial action that has already been taken. The second
exchange occurs before an appellate court considering the writ taken by
defense counsel following the trial court’s innovative and bold action in
refusing to exclude evidence of the methamphetamine lab despite the
Fourth Amendment violation. The exchange between the advocates and
the three judge appellate panel will explore the policy of the rule, the
effects of the rule outside the courtroom, and the appropriateness of one
trial judge in one county in one state court refusing exclusion of the
probative and incriminating evidence because of police error.
Before exploring how movement beyond the exclusionary rule can
be effectuated, however, it is necessary to show that such movement is
justified. Part II of this Article, therefore, examines the genesis of and
policy behind the exclusionary rule, the major limitations and exceptions
that have been developed to avoid the rule’s distasteful effects, and the
studies and data that have been accumulated concerning the rule’s
success, or lack thereof, in reaching its policy goals. This Part
demonstrates that the rule is not effective and change is justified. Part III

20. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily
assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future
counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.” (quoting United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975))); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
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discusses the propriety of using the state courts as laboratories for change
and experimentation within the framework of the federal system. Part IV
sets forth the hypothetical and follows the hypothetical trial prosecutor
through her attempts to cast the first pebble in the brook that leads to a
new course of Fourth Amendment protection. Part V concludes that
movement beyond the exclusionary rule is not only justified but also
possible, and that the state courts are the proper venue in which to make
the change.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR MOVING BEYOND
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Movement beyond the rule is justified by the exclusionary rule’s
limited success in achieving its policy goal of deterring police officer
violations of the Fourth Amendment as well as the distasteful effects of
the rule that courts have tried to mitigate through various limitations and
exceptions to the rule. This Part first examines the genesis of and policy
behind the exclusionary rule through Weeks, 21 Mapp, 22 and their
predecessors and progeny. It then examines the major limitations and
exceptions that have been developed in order to avoid the rule’s
distasteful effects. Finally, this Part summarizes the studies and the data
that have accumulated over the past forty-five years, reflecting the
success, or lack thereof, of the rule.
A. Genesis and Policy of the Rule
The contemporary understanding of the exclusionary rule, whereby
probative evidence against a criminal defendant is excluded because of
police error, did not suddenly emerge, fully developed. Instead, its
origins can be traced back to a civil forfeiture case, Boyd v. United
States, decided in 1886. 23 Between this beginning and the Court’s
articulation of the modern rule in its 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 24
the rule underwent many changes.

21. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22. Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
23. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Although Boyd does not seem to fit perfectly into the exclusionary
rule’s history, it has been named as the beginning of the Court’s move toward an exclusionary rule.
See Robert L. Misner, In Partial Praise of Boyd: The Grand Jury as a Catalyst for Fourth
Amendment Change, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 811–12 (1997) (discussing how Boyd birthed the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule).
24. 367 U.S. 643.
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In Boyd the defendant was forced, pursuant to a government
subpoena, to produce invoices that the prosecution intended to use
against him. 25 Boyd produced the invoices but objected to their use at
trial, claiming that their introduction violated his Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination. 26 The Supreme Court agreed and
held that production of the invoices violated both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. 27 The Court reasoned that
[a] compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner
of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a
witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure—an
unreasonable search and seizure—within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 28

Without discussion as to the policy served by exclusion, the Court
held that admitting the invoices was improper. 29 By so holding, the
Court in Boyd planted the first seeds that would mature into the
exclusionary rule we follow today; however, the path to Mapp was not
without its twists and turns.
In fact, in the 1904 case Adams v. New York, 30 decided eighteen
years after Boyd, the Supreme Court took a step back from the broad
principles it had enunciated in Boyd. Adams, convicted of possessing
gambling paraphernalia following an illegal police raid on his residence,
claimed that since his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the
evidence gathered from the raid should be excluded. 31 The Court, in
what amounted to dicta, explained that it saw no connection between the
Fourth Amendment violation and the exclusion of evidence and that “the
courts do not stop to inquire as to the means by which the evidence was
obtained.” 32 Furthermore, the Court noted,

25. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 634–35, 638.
28. Id. at 634–35.
29. Id. at 638. In addition to holding that the invoices should not have been admitted, the
Court also ruled that the entire action against the defendant was unconstitutional. Id. The Court
relied heavily on the history of the Fourth Amendment and their belief that the Framers of the
Amendment intended to restrain the government’s power to execute general warrants. Id.
30. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
31. Id. at 594.
32. Id.
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If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant
exceeded his authority, the party on whose complaint the warrant
issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the wrong done; but this
is no good reason for excluding the papers seized as evidence, if they
were pertinent to the issue . . . . 33

Thus, according to Adams, Fourth Amendment violations were the
personal responsibility of the offending officer and no good purpose was
served by exclusion of pertinent evidence, even that evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 34
Within a decade, however, the Court in Weeks v. United States
initiated the exclusionary rule for use in the federal system. 35 In
excluding probative evidence, the Weeks Court held that the Fourth
Amendment puts federal officials “in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such
power and authority.” 36 The Court emphasized the need to “forever
secure the people . . . against all unreasonable searches and seizures
under the guise of law,” 37 and reasoned that “[i]f letters and private
documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment . .
. is of no value.” 38 Concerned with the taint on judicial integrity, the
Court held that “[t]he tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of
the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and
enforced confessions . . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts which are charged at all times with the support of the
Constitution.” 39 Thus, in Weeks, judicial integrity emerged as the policy
goal of evidence exclusion.
Following Weeks, analysis of the exclusionary rule laid relatively
dormant until 1949 when the Court decided Wolf v. Colorado. 40
Suspecting Wolf of performing illegal abortions, Colorado police
searched his office without a warrant and obtained incriminating

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

8

Id. at 595.
Id.
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
Id. at 391–92.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 392.
338 U.S. 25 (1949).

1CALDWELL.FIN.DOC

1]

5/12/2006 12:36:00 PM

Fixing the Constable’s Blunder: The Exclusionary Rule

evidence. 41 In Wolf, the Court took the long overdue step of
incorporating the Fourth Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and making it applicable to the states; 42
however, the heart of its opinion focused on whether the federal rule of
evidence exclusion would be extended to state prosecutions. 43 The
Court, in refusing to extend the rule, voiced the following notion:
[I]n practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of
deterring unreasonable searches, [but] it is not for this Court to
condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due
Process Clause a State’s reliance upon other methods which, if
consistently enforced, would be equally effective. 44

The Court also reasoned that there were “reasons for excluding
evidence unreasonably obtained by the federal police which are less
compelling in the case of police under state or local authority.” 45
Specifically, “[t]he public opinion of a community can far more
effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police
directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion,
sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority
pervasively exerted throughout the country.” 46
Based on the Court’s commitment to the autonomy of the states, 47 its
reliance on the approaches of other jurisdictions, 48 and the “less
compelling reason” for excluding evidence in the case of state or local
police, 49 the Court felt no need to extend the exclusionary rule to the
states. 50 In fact, the Court even referred to the Weeks rule as one that
41. Wolf v. People, 187 P.2d 926, 927 (Colo. 1947), aff’d sub nom. Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949).
42. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27–28.
43. Id. at 25, 28–33. To decide this issue the Court focused much of its attention on whether
the Due Process Clause forbade the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. After holding that it
did not, the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to the states. Id. at 31–33.
44. Id. at 31. In support of its refusal to mandate the exclusionary rule to the states, the Court
also examined ten jurisdictions in the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of Nations
and found that “none has held evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure inadmissible.” Id. at
30. Moreover, the Court hesitated to treat the remedy of exclusion as an essential part of the Fourth
Amendment rights. This hesitation came after the majority found that “most of the English-speaking
world [did] not regard as vital to such protection the exclusion of evidence thus obtained.” Id. at 29.
45. Id. at 32.
46. Id. at 32–33.
47. Id. at 31–32.
48. Id. at 29–30.
49. Id. at 32.
50. Id. at 31–33.
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“was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth
Amendment” 51 but was created in Weeks through “judicial
implication.” 52 Particularly germane to this discussion is the fact that the
Wolf decision clearly focused the debate about the propriety of evidence
exclusion around the issue of exclusion as a means of deterring police
misconduct. 53
Incidents of local and state police misconduct, however, continued to
reverberate across the nation and just three years following Wolf, the
Court was confronted with a particularly egregious case of police
misconduct in Rochin v. California. 54 In Rochin, the police entered the
suspect’s house without a warrant, forced themselves into his bedroom
and, as he attempted to swallow capsules, struggled with him and then
hustled him to a hospital to have his stomach pumped. 55 The resulting
evidence from the illegal search and seizure was admitted at trial despite
Rochin’s objections. 56
Although the Court in Rochin showed deference to the state’s power
to define criminal conduct, 57 the Court noted that when a state
conviction “offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness” 58 that are at
the heart of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
state may not use the evidence at trial, and the defendant’s conviction
may not stand. 59 The Rochin Court felt “compelled to conclude that the
proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend
some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the
conscience.” 60 While Rochin did not mandate exclusion under the Fourth
Amendment, it cited the same policy concern from Weeks for permitting
exclusion under the Fourteenth Amendment, namely that the integrity of
the court should not be sullied with such ill begotten fruit. 61
51. Id. at 28.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 31 (recognizing for the first time that “the exclusion of evidence may be an
effective way of deterring unreasonable searches”).
54. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
55. Id. at 166.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 168–69.
58. Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17 (1945) (internal
quotations omitted)).
59. Id. at 169, 173–74.
60. Id. at 172.
61. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
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Two years later in Irvine v. California, the Court affirmed a
conviction despite its disgust with the conduct of the police. 62 Unlike the
circumstances in Rochin, the police conduct in Irvine “[did] not involve
coercion, violence or brutality to the person, but rather a trespass to
property, plus eavesdropping.” 63 Irvine is significant in that it recentered
the exclusionary rule dialogue on police deterrence. 64 Writing for the
Court, Justice Jackson noted that nearly two-thirds of the states refused
to exclude illegally obtained evidence despite the Court’s adoption of a
federal exclusionary rule some four decades earlier in Weeks. 65 Justice
Jackson surmised that this less-than-ringing endorsement for an
exclusionary rule was because “[t]here is no reliable evidence known to
us that inhabitants of those states which exclude the evidence suffer less
from lawless searches and seizures than those of states that admit it.” 66
The Court acknowledged the perceived minimal deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule:
That the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty
persons is more capable of demonstration than that it deters invasions
of right by the police. The case is made, so far as the police are
concerned, when they announce that they have arrested their man.
Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing
defendant. It deprives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker
because he has been pursued by another. It protects one against whom
incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing to protect
innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but fruitless searches.
The disciplinary or educational effect of the court’s releasing the
defendant for police misbehavior is so indirect as to be no more than a
mild deterrent at best. Some discretion is still left to the states in
criminal cases, for which they are largely responsible, and we think it is
for them to determine which rule best serves them. 67

62. 347 U.S. 128, 132, 137–38 (1954). Although the Supreme Court affirmed Irvine’s
conviction, it suggested that the Attorney General look into the case for potential violations of
federal law by the police. Id. at 137–38. The Supreme Court also directed the Clerk of the Court to
forward a copy of the record and the opinion to the Attorney General. Id. at 138.
63. Id. at 133.
64. See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text for the Court’s discussion of whether the
federal exclusionary rule was actually deterring unreasonable searches and seizures by the police.
65. Irvine, 347 U.S. at 135.
66. Id. at 136.
67. Id. at 136–37.
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Despite Justice Jackson’s vehemence and distaste for the rule and the
Court’s reluctance to extend the rule to the states, the sea change that
would be Mapp v. Ohio was a mere seven years away. 68
One year prior to Mapp, the Supreme Court, in Elkins v. United
States, held “that evidence obtained by state officers during a search
which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the
defendant’s immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment is inadmissible . . . in a federal criminal trial.” 69 This
decision effectively put an end to the “silver platter” doctrine whereby
state police officers would conduct the search and then hand the evidence
over to the federal authorities for their use. 70 However, it is the Court’s
discussion of the policy goals of deterrence that merits particular
attention here. Justice Stewart wrote that “[t]he [exclusionary] rule is
calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” 71 So it was that on the
eve of Mapp v. Ohio, deterrence fully emerged as the rationale for the
exclusionary rule.
Finally, in Mapp v. Ohio, 72 the Court applied the exclusionary rule
to the states. 73 The Court acknowledged, at least in part, that its past
reluctance to impose the rule on the states was based largely on factual
considerations. 74 Given that concern, Mapp was the perfect vehicle for
imposing the exclusionary rule on the states because the police conduct
68. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
69. 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
70. Id. at 208. See id. at 208 n.2 for cases discussing the silver platter doctrine.
71. Id. at 217. Despite Justice Stewart’s statement that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
was to deter, he recognized that statistical evidence demonstrating the effectiveness, or lack thereof,
of the rule was nearly impossible to come by. He stated,
Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants of states which follow
the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless searches and seizures than do those of
states which admit evidence unlawfully obtained. Since as a practical matter it is never
easy to prove a negative, it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be
assembled. For much the same reason, it cannot positively be demonstrated that
enforcement of the criminal law is either more or less effective under either rule.
Id. at 218.
72. 367 U.S. 643.
73. Id. at 655.
74. Id. at 650–53. The Mapp Court did not specify exactly what “factual considerations” it
was concerned with in previous cases where it refused to adopt the exclusionary rule for use in the
states. However, given the Court’s past hesitance to adopt the rule, it can be inferred that the facts in
previous cases were not as egregious as those in Mapp and, therefore, the Court did not feel
compelled to take strong action as they did in Mapp.
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in the case was particularly awful. 75 The police, without the authority of
a warrant, raided Dollree Mapp’s home, fought with her after she asked
to see a warrant and then forcibly dragged her around the home while
they conducted a thorough search. 76 The officers behavior was
sufficiently shocking to compel the Court to “close the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in
flagrant abuse of [the right to privacy], reserved to all persons.” 77
In Mapp, the Court took the final step in a seventy-five year line of
cases dealing with the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, and,
after recognizing the “obvious futility of relegating the Fourth
Amendment to the protection of other remedies,” 78 the Court removed
the inconsistency between state and federal courts and created a rule that
excluded illegally obtained evidence from all criminal trials. 79 The Court
was rightfully concerned that without safeguards such as the
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment “might as well be stricken
from the Constitution” 80 because it would be reduced to a “form of
words.” 81 The Court believed that deciding Mapp any other way would
protect a citizen’s right against invasion of privacy “but . . . withhold its
privilege and enjoyment.” 82 Justice Clark, writing for the Court, stated
that “the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter—to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by
removing the incentive to disregard it.’” 83
Although Justice Clark reiterated the Court’s deterrence rationale
from Elkins 84 and made brief mention to the preservation of judicial

75. The police went to Dollree Mapp’s home to investigate a tip regarding a recent bombing
and some information that a large amount of obscene materials was being kept in the home. After the
police arrived at Mapp’s home, she refused to let them in without a warrant. A few hours later, after
keeping the home under surveillance, several police officers forced down Mapp’s door and stormed
into her home. They waved a piece of paper, claiming that it was a warrant and refused to allow
Mapp’s attorney, who had arrived on the scene, into the house. As if the police had not done enough
to violate Mapp’s rights, they continued by struggling with her after she grabbed the “warrant” and
stuck it in her bosom. Following the struggle, Mapp was handcuffed and dragged around the house
while the police conducted a widespread search. Id. at 644–45.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 654–55.
78. Id. at 652.
79. Id. at 655.
80. Id. at 648 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)).
81. Id. at 655.
82. Id. at 656.
83. Id. (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
84. See id.
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integrity as an additional rationale, 85 he included no extensive discussion
of the policy goals for the exclusionary rule. Given the watershed
significance of Mapp, it is curious that the opinion neither extensively
detailed the deterrence benefits that would flow from the rule nor cited
any authority showing that exclusion would accomplish these goals. 86 It
is clear, however, that in Mapp the Court enforced the Fourth
Amendment’s right of privacy against the states “by the same sanction of
exclusion as is used against the Federal Government.” 87
The decisions from Boyd to Mapp demonstrate the Court’s gradual
shift from refusing to take notice of the process through which relevant
evidence came to the notice of the authorities, 88 to creating an
exclusionary rule within the federal system, 89 to incorporating the Fourth
Amendment into the Due Process Clause and making it applicable to the
states, 90 and finally to imposing the exclusionary rule on the states. 91
The most controversial rule in criminal procedure thus emerged through
eight cases decided over a seventy-five year span.
In the wake of Mapp, the question remains whether exclusion
actually does deter police misconduct. Perhaps it was a testament to the
Court’s uncertainty in opting for evidence exclusion that in Mapp it did
not preclude other methods of deterring police misconduct. 92 That door
has never been closed.
85. See id. At the end of its opinion the Court stated that its decision gives “to the courts[]
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.” Id. at 660. Given the Court’s
obvious concern with deliberate violations of constitutional rights and its recognition that something
needed to be in place in order to protect those rights, one hardly can consider this brief mentioning
of judicial integrity the primary reason for the imposition of the exclusionary rule on the states.
86. Instead of citing to authority for its decision, the Court focused on establishing a rule that
would enforce the Fourth Amendment’s protections. See id. at 660 (“[W]e can no longer permit [the
Fourth Amendment] right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner
and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it
to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment.”).
87. Id. at 655.
88. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594–95 (1904).
89. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
90. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949).
91. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
92. In his concurring opinion in Mapp, Justice Black stated that he agreed with the “plain
implication of the Court’s opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth
Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate.” Id. at 661
(Black, J., concurring) (citing Wolf, 338 U.S. at 39–40). Furthermore, in United States v. Calandra,
the Court held that “the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with any remedial device, the
application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought
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B. Limitations and Exceptions

Given the harsh social consequences of a rule that disallows relevant
evidence of crime, the post-Mapp retreat into the hills and valleys of
exceptions and limitations comes as no surprise. The retreat has led the
Court to bend and twist the application of the exclusionary rule itself, as
well as the laws of search and seizure, in an attempt to avoid the odious
consequences of exclusion. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to
detail every exception, if indeed that is even possible, the most
significant limitations are briefly set forth in this Section.
Foreshadowing the fits and starts that would come to be the hallmark
of the American rules of search and seizure, the Supreme Court, less than
two years after Mapp, acknowledged a limit to the application of the
exclusionary rule when “the connection between the [illegal] arrest and
the [resulting evidence] had ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint.’” 93 In Wong Sun, a case in which the illegal arrest of one man led
to evidence used to convict another person, the Court relied on a rule set
forth in Nardone v. United States, 94 decided twenty-two years before
Mapp, holding that the evidence was properly admitted because
sufficient intervening circumstances had broken the causal chain between
the initial illegal arrest and resulting evidence. 95 In setting forth the
standard to be applied, the Court held that evidence was not
automatically considered
“fruit of the poisonous tree” simply because it would not have
come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the
more apt question in such a case is “whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of

most efficaciously served.” 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). See also Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (stating that “because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally
mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its
‘substantial social costs’” (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))).
93. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (citing Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
94. 308 U.S. at 341.
95. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 473–75, 491; see id. at 484–85 for the Court’s discussion of
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), where the Court held that
illegally obtained facts may be used if “knowledge of them is gained from an independent source.”
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that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint.” 96
Thus, Wong Sun became the first case to recognize a limitation in the
post-Mapp world, which limitation served to blunt the impact of the
exclusionary rule.
After the attenuation exception in Wong Sun 97 came the grand jury
limitation of United States v. Calandra. 98 In this 1974 decision, the
Court held that a grand jury witness could not refuse to answer questions
even though the questions were generated by illegally obtained
evidence. 99 In Calandra, the Court once again acknowledged that “the
[exclusionary] rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police
conduct,” 100 but that the deterrent effect in this situation would be
“uncertain at best.” 101 This limitation is especially significant since it is
based on a failure of the rule to achieve its primary purpose—deterrence.
Once again police illegality and once again no evidence exclusion. The
Calandra Court was indeed uncertain of the deterrent impact of
excluding such evidence. 102
Four years later, in Rakas v. Illinois, the Court implemented its
broadest limitation of the exclusionary rule in holding that “a mere
passenger . . . lacks standing to challenge the legality of the search of [a]
vehicle.” 103 In limiting the class of persons that could assert the
exclusionary rule, the Court noted that Fourth Amendment rights are
personal 104 and that “[c]onferring standing to raise vicarious Fourth
Amendment claims would necessarily mean a more widespread

96. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (internal citations omitted) (relying on Nardone, 308 U.S. at
338, 341 (1939)).
97. Id.
98. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
99. Id. at 342, 354–55.
100. Id. at 347. The Court also quoted from the majority opinion in Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), which held that “[t]he rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”
101. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351. The Court further noted that “[w]hatever deterrence of police
misconduct may result from the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it is
unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly
further that goal.” Id.
102. Id.
103. 439 U.S. 128, 131 (1978) (refusing to recognize that passengers of a car have standing to
object to an illegal search of the car).
104. Id. at 133 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)).
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invocation of the exclusionary rule.” 105 In addition to limiting the rule’s
“widespread invocation,” the Rakas decision provided the clearest
evidence of the Court’s dissatisfaction with the marginal, even
questionable, benefits of deterring police action measured against the
substantial cost to the public of excluding incriminating evidence. 106 If
exclusion is the best means of achieving deterrence, why not a blanket
exclusion of all illegally seized evidence, regardless of who raises the
claim?
Less than two years after the Rakas limitation, the Court in United
States v. Havens further restricted application of the exclusionary rule by
holding that illegally obtained evidence could be used to impeach a
defendant’s testimony even though it could not be used in the
prosecution’s case in chief. 107 The Court held that in the impeachment of
testimony, the interest in the integrity of the fact-finding process was
outweighed by the interest in having false testimony refuted. 108 Writing
for the Court, Justice White emphasized “the importance of arriving at
the truth in criminal trials.” 109 This language is ironic considering that
highly probative and incriminating evidence is often precluded from
these same criminal trials under the exclusionary rule.
The 1984 term produced two decisions that further contracted the
breadth and scope of the rule. First, in Nix v. Williams, the defendant’s
statements, taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment, led the police to
the body of a girl he had murdered. 110 However, during the suppression
hearing, it was determined that the police, without the aid of the illegally
obtained statements, would have found the body within a short time. 111
The Court refused to suppress the body as evidence, reasoning that “[i]f
the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the
evidence should be received. Anything less would reject logic,

105. Id. at 137.
106. Id. The Court was “not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the
evidence which exposes the truth.” Id. (quoting Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174–75).
107. 446 U.S. 620, 627–28 (1980).
108. Id. at 627.
109. Id. at 626.
110. 467 U.S. 431, 434–40 (1984).
111. Id. at 437–38.
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experience, and common sense.” 112 Again, the Court demonstrated it
was willing to limit the exclusionary rule when it was shown that the
policy behind the rule was not met.
Less than a month later, the Court in United States v. Leon again
refused to exclude illegal evidence, which in this case had been seized
pursuant to a warrant that was later found to lack probable cause. 113 The
Court recognized that officers cannot be deterred when they have already
acted as a reasonable officer should act in the same situation. 114 Because
of the officer’s reasonable good faith belief that the warrant was
adequately supported, “the extreme sanction of exclusion [was]
inappropriate.” 115 The Court further acknowledged that evidence should
be suppressed only “in those unusual cases in which exclusion will
further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” 116 Such language would
seem to require an examination of every instance of police illegality to
assess the appropriateness of applying the exclusionary rule, implying
that when the goal of deterrence is not served, exclusion is not required.
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Leon is particularly significant.
He characterized Leon as “another chapter in the volume of Fourth
Amendment law” 117 and insisted that the Court must evaluate its past
decisions with a discerning eye and consider its future decisions as an
opportunity for change. He wrote, “What must be stressed, however, is
that any empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule in a
particular class of cases necessarily is a provisional one. By their very
nature, the assumptions on which we proceed today cannot be cast in
stone.” 118

112. Id. at 444.
113. 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
114. Id. at 919 (noting that when an officer has acted in complete good faith, “the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force” (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975))).
Furthermore, the Court went on to say that
[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then
evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 926 (quoting Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542).
115. Id. at 926.
116. Id. at 918.
117. Id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 928.
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Following the 1984 cases of Nix and Leon, the retreat from Mapp lay
relatively dormant 119 until 1998, when the Court held in Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott that parole boards were not
required to exclude illegally obtained evidence in parole revocation
hearings. 120 The Court, as it had done in Calandra, Nix, and Leon, 121
recognized the substantial costs imposed on society by the exclusionary
rule and, consequently, reeled in its scope. The decision thereby allowed
illegally obtained evidence to be admissible at parole revocation hearings
on the basis that “the marginal deterrence benefits . . . would be minimal
because the use of the exclusionary rule in criminal trials already deter[s]
illegal searches.” 122
The latest chapter in the Supreme Court’s contraction of the
exclusionary rule is United States v. Patane, decided in 2004. 123 As a
result of a Fifth Amendment violation, the police were led to a gun used
by the defendant. 124 In ruling that the gun could be allowed into
evidence, the Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment’s protections
against self-incrimination were “not implicated by the admission into
evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement.” 125 The Court
119. Although the Court may not have established any “landmark” exceptions or limitations
between 1984 and 1998, they did adopt some smaller, less known exceptions to the rule. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule should not apply when an
officer reasonably relies on a statute that is later deemed unconstitutional); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule would not apply to civil deportation
proceedings).
120. 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998).
121. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (recognizing that “the
application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served”). The Court in Calandra further noted that “[a]ny incremental deterrent
effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best.”
Id. at 351. See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (holding that “if the prosecution can
establish . . . that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received”);
Leon, 468 U.S. at 913 (noting that the Court’s “evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing
reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached
and neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible”). The Leon
Court also concluded that “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence
obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot
justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. at 922.
122. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 524 U.S. at 363. The Court’s decision also seemed to partially
rest on its unwillingness to interfere with the traditional administration procedure of parole
revocation hearings because “[t]he State . . . has an ‘overwhelming interest’ in ensuring that a
parolee complies with [parole] requirements.” Id. at 365.
123. 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
124. Id. at 635.
125. Id. at 637.
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saw no reason to require the exclusion of the physical evidence resulting
from an unwarned statement because “unlike unreasonable searches . . .
with respect to mere failures to warn, [there is] nothing to deter.” 126
These cases clearly demonstrate that rather than extending the
exclusionary rule’s protections in the forty-five years since its Mapp
decision, the Court has consistently reined in the rule. It has done so
because the costs incurred by the public often do not outweigh the
deterrence “benefit” that may result. However, despite the Court’s
pullback, the rule continues to operate in a vast number of situations.
C. Studies and Data as to the Efficacy of the Rule
Is there really a deterrence “benefit” tradeoff? As of the writing of
this Article, fifteen studies of various kinds have been conducted
attempting to answer that very question. 127 Some of the studies involved
surveys of police officers; 128 others surveyed persons other than police
officers involved in the criminal justice system; 129 some analyzed
statistics regarding arrests, convictions, and suppression motions; 130 and
one study even attempted the direct observation of police officers in the
field. 131 Of the fifteen studies, three have attempted to ascertain directly
from police officers whether the exclusionary rule deters them from
engaging in searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment:
the 1987 Orfield Study, 132 the 1991 Heffernan and Lovely Study, 133 and
126. Id. at 642. The Court also relied on the fact that the Fifth Amendment already contained
its own exclusionary rule because of its provision that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Id. at 640 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). Based on
this reasoning, the Court did not see any reason to extend the exclusionary rule’s reach to the Fifth
Amendment.
127. See supra note 11; infra notes 132–36, 183–85.
128. See infra notes 137–78 and accompanying text for a summary of the three studies that
have attempted to understand the rule’s effectiveness by questioning police officers.
129. See Michael Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in
North Carolina. The Model, the Study, and the Implications, 45 N.C. L. REV. 119 (1966), Stuart S.
Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 283, and
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the
Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75 (1992), for the studies that have questioned others
involved in the criminal justice system.
130. See infra note 136 for the eight studies that have examined the rule through the use of
statistics rather than by questioning police officers or others involved in the criminal justice system.
131. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966). In this unique study, Jerome
Skolnick has attempted to gauge the rule’s effectiveness by undertaking direct observation of police
officers in the field.
132. Orfield, supra note 11.
133. Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11.
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the 1998 Perrin, Caldwell, and Chase Study. 134 I have focused this
inquiry on these latter three studies as they have attempted to gauge the
“cognitive component of deterrence,” 135 specifically police officer
motivation to avoid illegal searches and seizures. While the remaining
studies that engage in statistical analysis and surveys certainly provide
helpful data, they do not probe officer motivation to abide by the
rules, 136 which is the overarching question of the deterrence rationale for
the exclusionary rule.
1. The Orfield study
In conducting his study, Myron Orfield interviewed twenty-six
police officers deployed in the Narcotics Section of the Chicago Police
Department. 137 His findings are fascinating in that all of the officers he
interviewed said they approved of the exclusionary rule, but when
Orfield pushed them as to specifics concerning their approval, their
responses generally belied their initial assessment. 138 For instance, more
than half said the rule “frequently,” “reasonably often,” or “very
frequently” kept them from making a search they thought they should
134. Perrin et al., supra note 11.
135. Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11, at 321.
136. There have been numerous studies that attempt to understand the exclusionary rule’s
effects without questioning officers. For example, in 1963 Professor Stuart Nagel sent out 250
questionnaires to prosecuting attorneys, judges, police chiefs, defense attorneys, and ACLU officials
in order to gain an understanding of the effects that the exclusionary rule was having. Nagel, supra
note 129, at 283–84. Three years later, in 1966, Michael Katz attempted to study the rule by sending
out over two hundred questionnaires to police chiefs, sheriffs, prosecuting attorneys, defense
attorneys, and trial judges in North Carolina. Katz, supra note 129, at 131. More recently, in 1992
Myron Orfield conducted a study by interviewing public defenders, judges, states attorneys, and
other prosecutors in Cook County, Chicago. Orfield, supra note 129, at 85–88. Eight studies have
been conducted by analyzing arrest statistics, conviction statistics, return of seized property, and
suppression motions. See NIJ STUDY, supra note 2, at 2; COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS, GGD-79-45 (1979); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-andSeizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87 (1968) [hereinafter Effect of
Mapp v. Ohio]; Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and
a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681 (1973); Bradley C. Canon, Testing the
Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State and Federal Levels, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977);
Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 715
(1970); James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Uchida & Bynum, supra note 11. Finally, there has been
one study that attempted direct observation of police officers in the field. See SKOLNICK, supra note
131, at 33–35.
137. Orfield, supra note 11, at 1024–25.
138. Id. at 1053.
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make. 139 Further, fifty percent of the officers said the rule did a
“moderate amount” of harm to police work. 140 Faint praise indeed. This
seeming contradiction between approval of the rule and the rule’s
negative effects on police work is best understood in a comparative
sense: to the officers, the exclusionary rule is preferable to a system that
would permit victims of illegal searches to sue them. 141 The officers
overwhelmingly believed that such a direct sanction would have a
chilling effect on how they went about their jobs. 142 A greater chilling
effect than the exclusionary rule even? Consequently, even though the
rule often kept them from doing their job and resulted in harm to police
work, it was preferable to the direct sanctions that would otherwise be
imposed against them. 143
Orfield, noting that the deterrence goal of the rule can occur only if
the offending officers learn from their mistakes, also questioned the
officers on whether the existence of the rule improves police knowledge
of the rules of search and seizure. 144 Orfield found that eighty-five
percent of the twenty-six responding officers said they were always
informed when the evidence they seized had been suppressed and that
they generally understood the basis for the suppressions. 145 While these
findings, at first blush, would seem to support the deterrence rationale,
they must be put in context. All of the twenty-six responding officers
worked in the Narcotics Section and were aware of that section’s policy
of demotion or transfer upon a second suppression. 146 It may well be that
the threat of the more direct sanction pushed this small group of officers
to better learn and comply with the intricacies of the Fourth Amendment.
Orfield’s study also addressed some of the costs of the exclusionary
rule, specifically police perjury at suppression hearings. His interviews
disclosed that almost all the officers admitted that police occasionally
lie. 147 He found that approximately half of the responding officers stated
139. Id. at 1052–53.
140. Id. at 1053.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1053–54. Nearly ninety-five percent of the officers surveyed believed a chilling
effect would result if victims were allowed to sue the offending officer.
143. Id. at 1053.
144. Id. at 1033–34.
145. Id.
146. Id at 1044–46.
147. Id. at 1049–50. According to his results, Orfield found that nineteen out of the twentytwo surveyed officers reported that occurrences in which a judge did not believe a police officer was
“unusual, but not rare.” Id. at 1049. Additionally, two of the responding officers reported that judges
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that judges were “frequently correct” in disbelieving police testimony. 148
Perhaps even more alarming was that seventy-six percent stated that the
police often “shade the facts” to establish probable cause. 149
From his mixed findings, Orfield surprisingly concluded that the rule
does serve its deterrence goals. 150 He believed his findings supported the
view that the police are knowledgeable in Fourth Amendment law, that
they learn from their mistakes, and that they are positioned to comport
their conduct to the law in the future. 151
Several concerns arise in assessing the value of Orfield’s study in
determining the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. First, his
conclusions are undermined by the scant number of officers involved. In
addition, he surveyed narcotics officers who, because of their regular
exposure to suppression motions, were more conversant in Fourth
Amendment law than most other police officers. 152 Further, his findings
that officers unanimously approve of the exclusionary rule 153 were
largely contradicted in his more focused follow-up inquiries and, in large
part, may well be a function of the fear of more direct sanctions such as
job terminations, job suspensions, or fines against offending police
officers.
2. The Heffernan and Lovely study
The second significant study involving the direct questioning of the
police was conducted in 1991 by Professors William Heffernan and
Richard Lovely. 154 Heffernan and Lovely attempted to gauge the level of
police understanding of search and seizure law, believing that police
ignorance of the subject would undermine the deterrent effect of the

“commonly” disbelieve police testimony, while one officer reported that judges “never” disbelieve
police testimony. Id. Of the responding officers, forty-eight percent stated that judges were
“frequently correct” in disbelieving police testimony. Id. at 1049–50. Perhaps most alarming was
that seventy-six percent of the responding officers stated that the police often “shade the facts” to
establish probable cause. Id. at 1050.
148. See Caldwell & Chase, supra note 2, at 52–53 (arguing that because of the exclusionary
rule’s effect, “officers have an incentive to commit perjury or . . . to carefully tailor the description
of their investigative activities”). Thus, rather than deterring police misconduct as the rule was
intended, it has motivated “officers to commit other illegal acts.” Id. at 53.
149. Orfield, supra note 11, at 1050.
150. Id. at 1054.
151. Id. at 1033–34, 1036.
152. Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 681.
153. Orfield, supra note 11, at 1051.
154. Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11.
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exclusionary rule. 155 Utilizing a far larger number of respondents than in
Orfield’s 1987 study, the authors administered a series of hypotheticals
based on recent Supreme Court rulings involving warrantless police
intrusion. 156 The authors also gave the same questions to groups of
prosecutors and public defenders as well as college students enrolled in
an introductory criminal justice course. 157 Predictably, of the three
groups, the lawyers demonstrated the most thorough knowledge of
search and seizure law (73.3%), the police followed (56.7%), and the
college students brought up the rear (48%). 158 In addition to concluding
that slightly more than half of police officers were knowledgeable with
recent search and seizure decisions, the study showed that an alarming
34% of police officers believed it was legal to make a warrantless search
when actual circumstances would render the action unconstitutional. 159
Even though Heffernan and Lovely concluded that the indirect sanction
of evidence exclusion and perhaps lost prosecutions was sufficient to
deter most officers from Fourth Amendment violations, 160 the poor
performance by the officers regarding Fourth Amendment law seems to
undermine that conclusion. There can be no deterrence in the absence of
police understanding the law.
One other finding of this study merits attention. Heffernan and
Lovely found that out of the more than 500 officers surveyed, 15%
would intentionally follow an illegal course of conduct. 161 Thus, nearly
one in six would knowingly violate someone’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Such a number is significant in itself, but when one realizes that it
is almost assuredly understated, it raises serious concerns about the
effectiveness of the indirect sanction of the exclusionary rule.
3. The Perrin, Caldwell, and Chase study
The third study of significance that attempts to ascertain directly
from officers the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule was conducted

155. Id. at 311, 355.
156. Id. at 326–27. Orfield surveyed only twenty-six officers in one department while
Hefferman and Lovely surveyed 547 officers in several different departments. See id. at 331;
Orfield, supra note 11, at 1024–25.
157. Hefferman & Lovely, supra note 11, at 331.
158. Id. at 332–33.
159. Id. at 346, 355.
160. Id. at 361.
161. Id. at 345–52.
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by Professors Tim Perrin, Carol Chase, and me. 162 In this study we sent
out questionnaires to the 1144 law enforcement officers in Ventura
County, California and received responses back from 411 of them.
Additionally, we surveyed a group of officers from throughout California
who had recently attended a continuing education seminar at which they
received instruction on search and seizure law. 163 We used this latter
group for comparative purposes to test the value and effect of continuing
education. Also for comparative purposes, we administered the same
hypothetical questions concerning search and seizure law (part of the
questionnaire) to eighty first-year law students who had just completed a
criminal procedure class. The questionnaire consisted of three sections:
information concerning biographical information (rank, experience, and
education); search and seizure law; and police interrogation practices. 164
The second and third sections were designed to provide information
concerning the “cognitive component of deterrence,” “specific deterrence
of offending officers,” the costs of the exclusionary rule, and alternatives
to the rule. 165
When asked whether the threat of suppression of evidence influenced
their conduct, the officers’ responses from both groups were not
surprising. Nearly sixty percent believed suppression to be an important
concern but not a primary concern. 166 What did surprise us was that over
eighteen percent of the respondents felt the threat of suppression was
only a minor concern or no concern at all. 167
Like Orfield, we were curious about the level of communication
police officers received concerning suppression hearings, recognizing
that if the rule is to have any specific deterrent effect, the offending
162. Perrin et al., supra note 11. This 1997 study was conducted by questionnaire that was
sent to the Ventura County (California) Sheriff’s Department and each of the county’s five police
departments: Oxnard, Port Hueneme, Santa Paula, Simi Valley, and Ventura. Of the 1144 law
enforcement officers surveyed, 411 responded to the questionnaire. Id. at 712–13.
163. Id. at 713. The same questionnaire that was sent to Ventura County law enforcement
officers was also sent to police officers throughout the state of California “who had recently attended
a continuing education seminar at which they received instruction on search and seizure law and
practice and police interrogation law and practice.” Id. The questionnaire received fifty-five
responses out of a possible 270 officers, which is a twenty percent response rate. Id.
164. Id. at 713–14. To maximize officer participation, the survey was limited to “forty-five
multiple-choice or fill-in-the-blank questions, requiring less than thirty minutes to complete.” Id.
Also, in preparing the questions, input was solicited from “a broad cross-section of law enforcement
officials and others in the criminal justice system.” Id.
165. Id. at 714–19.
166. Id. at 720.
167. Id. at 720–21.
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officer must learn of the ruling and the reasons for it. Of all the officers
surveyed, fifty-five percent admitted that on at least one occasion,
evidence they had recovered had been excluded, 168 and more than twothirds of the officers stated that they heard the ruling in court or were
informed of the ruling by the prosecutor. 169 Following up on this point,
we analyzed the responses to ascertain if the officers who admitted past
violations scored differently on the search and seizure questions from
those officers who claimed to have never had evidence excluded. We
found no statistically significant difference in the questionnaire results of
the two groups. 170 From this it could be concluded that there was no
specific deterrent effect in terms of causing the officers to better
understand the rules.
As to police officer knowledge of the law of search and seizure, we
found a widespread inability among the officers to correctly respond to
the hypothetical questions concerning search and seizure law. 171 The
average number of correct responses to the four search and seizure
questions and the question about the purpose of the exclusionary rule
was 2.6 out of five. 172 While educational background, rank, and
experience did not necessarily affect performance, search and seizure
education and training appeared to positively affect performance in
answering the hypothetical questions correctly. 173
We also surveyed the respondents concerning police perjury. 174
More than eighty percent of the study’s participants indicated they had
168. Id. at 722.
169. Id. at 722–23 (noting that 72.2% of the sheriff’s department participants and 69.5% of the
police officers stated that they heard the court’s ruling in court or were informed of it by the
prosecutor). “A total of 21 officers, just less than 5% of the total, answered that on at least one
occasion they never learned of the court’s ruling after they testified.” Id.
170. Id. at 724–25.
The officers without prior exclusions had a mean score of 2.86 on the five search and
seizure hypotheticals and the question about the purpose of the rule, and those with prior
exclusions had a mean score of 2.94. The .08 difference between the two groups is not
statistically significant. In the police interrogation hypotheticals, the officers without prior
exclusions had a mean score of 4.44 out of the six police interrogation questions, and
those with prior exclusions had a mean score of 4.30. Thus, those with prior violations
actually performed worse than the officers who had never had their evidence excluded,
suggesting that the exclusionary rule has no specific deterrent effect, at least in terms of
causing the officers to better understand the application of the rules.
Id.
171. Id. at 727–32.
172. Id. at 728.
173. Id. at 730.
174. Id. at 725–27.
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no knowledge of any officer attempting to avoid suppression by
misrepresenting the facts. 175 Such numbers may result from a reluctance
to reveal such sensitive information, which is understandable. Further, to
no surprise, those officers with more experience reported a greater
number of perjury incidents than their less-experienced peers. 176
The survey’s final area of inquiry concerned possible alternatives to
the exclusionary rule. Not surprisingly, fifty-seven percent of the
participants from both groups of officers indicated that the criminal
justice system was well served by the current law. 177 The more direct the
sanction, the less popular it was with the respondents. 178
4. Inherent weaknesses of exclusionary rule studies
As Dallin Oaks noted in his groundbreaking 1970 study, the greatest
difficulty in measuring the exclusionary rule’s deterrent effect is that
studies attempting such measuring “all tend to oversimplify an
enormously complex inquiry.” 179 Oaks suggested that attempts to
175. Id. at 725.
176. Id.
[T]he officers with the lowest average number of known instances of perjury were those
with less than one year of experience (reporting no known instances) and the officers
with the highest average were the most experienced officers (reporting 1.1697 known
instances per officer). Similarly, those with the rank of ‘officer’ reported the lowest
average (.4556 per officer), and those with a rank above detective reported the highest
average (.7987 per officer). This trend held true for three of the four perjury questions.
Id.
177. Id. at 732.
[T]he most popular suggested alternative remedy was a requirement that officers attend
educational courses on search and seizure or police interrogation with more than onethird of the respondents choosing that option. The other options, which each involved
significant adverse consequences to the police officer, were markedly less popular. In
fact, their mere inclusion offended some of the officers and seemed unfair to others.
About two out of ten officers were willing to entertain the possibility of implementing
internal police discipline as a consequence of misconduct. The least popular option
among the respondents was the criminal prosecution of an offending officer, including
the possibility of incarceration. About one percent of the officers selected that option. A
number of officers hedged their answers depending on the culpability of the officer,
suggesting that stronger penalties were appropriate for intentional misconduct as opposed
to good faith conduct.
Id.
178. Id.
179. See Oaks, supra note 136, at 715. Oaks examined the entire body of previous empirical
work that had been done on the exclusionary rule. Id. at 678–709. Oaks also conducted his own
original research after studying and analyzing arrest and conviction statistics from Cincinnati for a
period of eleven years (five years before and six years after Mapp). Based on a significant drop in
gambling convictions, Oaks concluded that, at least for gambling, there were “significant changes in
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measure the effects of the rule involve “complicated inquiry into human
motivation within a complex social model.” 180 He was pessimistic that
definitive findings could ever be reached and felt that at best we can
“nibble around the edges of the problem by small inquiries that
illuminate areas of special importance.” 181 While it is true that the
motivation and intent of law enforcement personnel evades direct
observation and constitutes an imposing barrier to the study of the
rule, 182 we cannot just throw up our hands in despair. Even in the face of
Oaks’s pessimism, there are some definitive findings as well as
meaningful and useful conclusions to be drawn from the studies
concerning the efficacy of the rule.
5. Conclusions
The three studies examined do call into question the effectiveness of
the exclusionary rule in deterring police illegality and provide some
insights into police knowledge of search and seizure law and police
motivations to abide by that law. The results of the Heffernan & Lovely
study and the Perrin, Caldwell, and Chase study indicate that the police
are not particularly well-versed in Fourth Amendment law, 183 which
limits the amount of deterrence the rule can effectuate. As for the

police behavior, which may have included closer adherence to constitutional standards of search and
seizure.” Id. at 691. However, based on statistics regarding the seizures of both weapons and
narcotics, Oaks found no significant changes in police behavior in the periods before and after
Mapp. Id. at 694.
180. Id. at 715. Measuring the effects of the exclusionary rule is an extremely difficult task
because in addition to trying to determine the effect the rule is having on the subjective intent of
officers, those who study the rule’s effects are impeded by the officer’s hesitance to be completely
honest in his or her answers. For example, police officers are likely to be hesitant to admit that they
have lied in a suppression hearing or that they have crafted their version of the facts to ensure that
probable cause or reasonable suspicion was present when it really was not. Additionally, while
officers may feel that the rule hampers their ability to function as law enforcement officials, the
police still prefer the rule over any type of direct sanction that may be imposed on them.
181. Id. at 716.
182. See id. at 715 (discussing the “breadth and complexity of the motivation problem”). Oaks
recognized that any effort to gauge the rule’s effectiveness as a deterrent is limited by several factors
that affect the deterrent effects of any sanction, including the differences among men, varieties of
threatened behavior, differences in the way the threat is communicated, individual perceptions of the
applicability and credibility of the threat, variations in threatened consequences, and the moral
quality of the threatened individual. Id. Furthermore, Oaks noted that ‘the police’ is not a
‘monolithic entity’ and that each individual within the department is going to be affected by his
individual and unique assignment. Id. at 716.
183. See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11, at 332–33; Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 727–
32.
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motivation to follow the rules, the results from all these studies are
muddier still. While the police overwhelmingly endorse the idea of the
rule, they believe that it cuts into their effectiveness because it has a
chilling impact on their performance. 184 Finally, the incidence of police
perjury to avoid evidence exclusion is more than a minimum
consideration. 185
III. USING THE STATES AS LABORATORIES
Because the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional question, change
need not necessarily come from on high. Certainly the Supreme Court
could further limit the scope of the rule or, for that matter, completely
abandon the rule in favor of some new direction.186 But these options are
not the only means of effectuating change. For example, Congress could
step in and implement some new direction, 187 or change could spring
forth from more modest pedestals. Over seventy years ago, in the final
paragraph of his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 188 Justice
Brandeis wrote: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.” 189 While Liebmann concerned the
constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited the manufacture, sale,
and distribution of ice without a license, 190 Brandeis viewed the issue on

184. Orfield, supra note 11, at 1053–54.
185. Id. at 1049–50; Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 725–27.
186. See supra Part II.B. The Supreme Court has already limited the scope of the rule in many
ways; undoubtedly it could continue on this path. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never
indicated that exclusion is the only way to protect the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 92; see
also infra notes 250–52.
187. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring).
I agree with the conclusion of the Court that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of
“unreasonable searches and seizures” is enforceable against the states. Consequently, I
should be for reversal of this case if I thought the Fourth Amendment not only prohibited
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” but also, of itself, barred the use of evidence so
unlawfully obtained. But I agree with what appears to be a plain implication of the
Court’s opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth
Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate.
Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39–40 (1949) (Black, J., concurring)).
188. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
189. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 271. New State Ice Company manufactured, sold, and distributed ice under a
license issued by the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma. The Oklahoma legislature set forth an
act that required such a license and the New State Ice Company brought this suit to enjoin Liebmann
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a much broader scale—one that spoke to the genius of America’s federal
system. He observed that “[t]here must be power in the States and the
Nation to remould [sic], through experimentation, our economic
practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic
needs.” 191 The Constitution Brandeis envisioned was “surely a ‘garment’
rather an ‘iron strait-jacket,’” 192 and he believed that experimentation
was a “means of uncovering the truth, and . . . that humans had the power
to alter their destiny rather than simply being fated to endure it.” 193
Brandeis’s observation built on the work of Alexis De Tocqueville,
another influential observer of the American experiment nearly a century
earlier. 194 In his seminal work Democracy in America, 195 De
Tocqueville wrote that “[i]n large centralized nations the lawgiver is
bound to give the laws a uniform character which does not fit the
diversity of places and of mores.” 196 It has also been said that “the
history of American federal law in every era has reflected the adoption of
the best—and occasionally the worst—of experiments first implemented

from manufacturing, selling, or distributing ice in Oklahoma City without first obtaining the required
license. Id.
191. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
192. G. Edward White, Biographies of Titans: Holmes, Brandeis, and Other Obsessions: The
Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
576, 603 (1995). White suggests that the Liebmann dissent revealed two facets of Brandeis’ judicial
perspective: (1) the ability to see legal issues as social and economic realities, and (2) the belief that
humans had the capacity “to alter purportedly inexorable external forces in a nation’s history. If
economic difficulties existed because of ‘evils’ that had become embedded in the structure of
American industry, those evils could be corrected.” Id.
193. Id. For Brandeis, the concept of experimentation demonstrated “his enthusiasm for
empirical research—personified by economics and the physical sciences.” Id.
194. ANDREW J. CONSENTINO, A PASSION FOR LIBERTY: ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE ON
DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION (1989), excerpts available at http://www.tocqueville.org/
chap1.htm. Tocqueville was “[a]n aristocratic Frenchman who came to the U.S. in 1831—when he
was only 25 years old—and later wrote Democracy in America, a two-volume study of the American
people and their political institutions. The book is frequently quoted by journalists and politicians.”
Id.
195. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (George Lawrence trans., spec. ed.,
First Perennial Library 1988) (1835).
196. Id. at 161.
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in the laboratory of the states.” 197 Indeed, a diversity of thought and
experiences has been a hallmark of American history. 198
The notion of smaller units serving as laboratories for larger units
predates the American Constitution. In many ways, the American
Constitution itself was a product of that notion as it was built upon
lessons learned from the constitutions of the original states. 199 In seeking
support for a national constitution, Alexander Hamilton stressed to his
fellow New Yorkers that the proposed federal constitution would closely
resemble New York’s state constitution. 200
This idea of state courts serving as laboratories for federal courts
resurfaced most recently in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Gonzales v.
Raich. 201 In Gonzales, the Court held that Congress had authority to
regulate production of marijuana for medical use even after such use was
deemed legal under California law. 202 O’Connor’s dissent delved into
the nature of state powers as well as overreaching federalism:
This case exemplifies the role of States as laboratories. The States’ core
police powers have always included authority to define criminal law
and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. . . . Today
the Court sanctions an application of the federal Controlled Substances
Act that extinguishes [California’s] experiment. . . . [T]he Court
announces a rule that gives Congress a perverse incentive to legislate
broadly . . . nestling questionable assertions of its authority into
comprehensive regulatory schemes—rather than with precision. 203

197. Frederick A.O. Schwartz, Jr., States and Cities as Laboratories of Democracy, Address at
The Association of The Bar of the City of New York’s Conference: From the Ground Up: Local
Lessons for National Reform (Nov. 9, 1988), in 54 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 157, 160 (1994).
198. Id. Schwartz added that “[f]rom the birth of our most fundamental freedoms to the
victims’ rights and environmental reforms of recent decades, the federal government frequently has
followed in the footsteps of trailblazing states and cities.” Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2220–21 (2005) (O’Connor, J. dissenting). In his majority opinion,
Justice Stevens stated,
The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress by Article I,
§ 8, of the Constitution “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” its authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States” includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of
marijuana in compliance with California law.
Id. at 2198–99 (majority opinion).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

31

1CALDWELL.FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/12/2006 12:36:00 PM

[2006

While echoing Brandeis’ call for experimentation, O’Connor expounded
upon his concern with overreaching judicial power. Brandeis’ dissent in
Liebmann “cautioned courts to resist interfering with the process of
experimentation” 204 and recognized that “[j]udges have a ‘grave
responsibility’ when they exercise the power they have ‘to prevent an
experiment.’” 205 Brandeis warned that “[d]enial of the right to
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.” 206
Brandeis’s “states-as-laboratories” metaphor has not been without
criticism. 207 Critics argue that “state policy experimentation is produced
individually, haphazardly, and under circumstances that are unlikely to
yield information suitable for use by other states.” 208 Brandeis
acknowledged those concerns, recognizing that experimentation had
risks and required a process of “trial and error.” 209 He maintained,
204. Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2004). Althouse opines that there are vanguard states and laggard
states, and that each have affected the Court’s federalism doctrine in different ways. Brandeis
believed in vanguard states that protected federalism through state autonomy and the ability to
experiment with new ideas.
205. Id.
206. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
207. James A. Gardner, The “States-As-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional Law,
30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475 (1996). Since first appearing in 1932, Brandeis’s states-as-laboratories
metaphor has been used in numerous court opinions and law review articles. Consequently, Gardner
believes that the metaphor “deserves a skeptical reexamination” because its users have lost sight of
its original meaning. Id. at 475.
208. Id. at 481–82. Gardner uses a hypothetical example, stating the following:
Suppose a state adopts a constitutional policy that protects personal privacy at the
expense of apprehending criminals by strengthening its exclusionary rule. How ought
judges in another state evaluate the success of such a policy? Even if it were possible to
calculate the increase in crime directly attributable to an expanded exclusionary rule, how
should judges weigh the marginally increased risk of crime against the marginal increase
in personal freedom? Whether such a tradeoff has improved the quality of life in the
state–that is, whether the “experiment” has succeeded–is the kind of judgment that only
the people of that state are competent to make.
The subjectivity of state policy experimentation, and thus the irrelevance to other
states of the information obtained through policy experiments, is only increased to the
extent that, as is so often claimed, each state is unique. If the people of the different states
have unique characters or values, for example, or if they live their lives under conditions
different enough to affect the content of constitutional doctrine, then the usefulness of
policy experimentation is to the same extent confined to the state’s borders. If life in
Texas is really fundamentally different from life in California, it is hard to see how either
state can learn much from the experiences of the other.
Id. (citations omitted).
209. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 310 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis saw experimentation as a
process of trial and error. In his dissenting opinion, he used air travel as an example to further the
notion that skepticism towards new ideas can be overcome through experimentation: “There are
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however, that such experimentation confined the risks to just one
state. 210 When one state serves as a laboratory, it can experiment with
new policies, “producing evidence about the effectiveness and
workability of new programs, to be followed, improved upon, or avoided
by the rest of the states, who can look upon [that] one state’s experiment
and learn.” 211 History is replete with examples such as “[u]nemployment
compensation, minimum-wage laws, public financing of political
campaigns, no-fault insurance, hospital cost containment, and
prohibitions against discrimination in housing and employment, all [of
which] originated in state legislatures.” 212 Some proved to be successful
national prototypes while others were found wanting. 213

many men now living who were in the habit of using the age-old expression: ‘It is as impossible as
flying.’ The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in invention, attest the value of the process
of trial and error.” Id.
210. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Althouse, supra note 204, at 1745–46.
Justice Louis Brandeis famously characterized the states as laboratories of democracy.
The most appealing reason for courts to enforce limits on Congress and to preserve the
role of autonomous states is the prediction that states will in fact experiment with new
policies, looking for new ways to serve the public good, putting new ideas into practice,
and producing evidence about the effectiveness and workability of new programs, to be
followed, improved upon, or avoided by the rest of the states, who can look upon one
state’s experiment and learn.
Id.
211. Althouse, supra note 204, at 1746.
212. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988).
Both the language and history of the guarantee clause support the conclusion that the
clause prohibits the federal government from interfering with state sovereignty in a
manner that would destroy republican government in the states. . . . [T]he guarantee
clause produces a workable concept of federalism—one that preserves the values of
independent state governments without denying the federal government the power to
address compelling national concerns.
Id. at 36.
213. Id. While unemployment compensation, minimum-wage laws, public financing of
political campaigns, and prohibitions against discrimination in housing and employment have all
been implemented on a national level, no-fault insurance and hospital cost containment are two
examples of state-tested policies that have not been adopted nationally.
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Brandeis challenged both states and judges to be “bold.” 214 His
dissent argued for “trusting government experimenters with their ‘novel’
ideas and refraining from serving mere ‘prejudices’—as opposed to true
‘principles’—which the ‘high power’ of review judges have designed for
themselves.” 215 He urged courts to allow the “single courageous
State” 216 to experiment rather than being complacent with their own
preconceived principles. 217
Yet state courts are still hesitant to “experiment” because they are
often unsure of the limits placed on their power. 218 State court judges
often conform their role to the federal model thinking that it provides the
proper guideline. 219 Helen Hershkoff argues, however, that “state
systems should take an independent and pragmatic approach to judicial
authority in order to facilitate and support their integral and vibrant role
in state governance.” 220 State courts abide by a national law when they
are uncertain if they have the power to experiment, 221 and perhaps, in
214. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Brandeis
concluded,
This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute
which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable. We have the power to do this, because the due process clause has been
held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of
procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we
erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we
must let our minds be bold.
Id.
215. Id.; see also Althouse, supra note 204, at 1751–52.
216. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
217. Id.; see also Althouse, supra note 204, at 1751–52.
218. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001). Hershkoff addresses justiciability and, more specifically,
the interplay between federal judges and state courts. Id. Hershkoff recognizes the trepidation of
state courts and suggests that the federal judiciary maintains a “posture of judicial restraint.” Id. at
1898. She goes on to observe that “[b]y staying its hand, the Court affords states and localities the
space necessary to remedy constitutional violations through ‘the political process established by the
citizens of the State’ rather than ‘by judicial decree mandated by Federal Government and invoked
by the private citizen.’” Id. at 1899 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999)). State courts
provide citizens with an avenue to influence the laws that govern and benefit society as whole. Id. at
1899–1900.
219. Id. at 1875–76. State courts can accord greater protection to individual rights, but they
cannot lessen the protection provided by the United States Constitution. Consequently, state judges
often look to the federal model for guidance even when federal law is not applicable. Hershkoff
recognized that “many state court judges conform their role to Article III limits, on the view that the
federal model reflects the proper measure of the adjudicative function.” Id.
220. Id. at 1941.
221. Id. at 1875–76.
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part, it is that uncertainty that accounts for the lack of state-driven
innovation regarding the exclusionary rule. Ironically, however, the
Court has left the door ajar with regard to this particular remedy. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority in the 1995 case Arizona v. Evans
said, “[t]he Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands.” 222 Rehnquist viewed the exclusionary rule’s remedy and
Fourth Amendment rights as “separate” issues. 223 The exclusionary rule,
he wrote, was “designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth
Amendment rights through its deterrent effects.” 224 It was never
intended to be an absolute mandate. 225 Instead, “[a]s with any remedial
device, the rule’s application has been restricted to those instances where
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. Where ‘the
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly,
its use . . . is unwarranted.’” 226 This is nothing short of a plea for
something else, something better. What better time and what better tool
than the state laboratories to experiment, to try something new and
beyond the current approach.
Justice Brandeis was hopeful that state-court laboratories could spark
change where change was needed. 227 His words serve as a challenge to
the courts and the country to embrace change rather than reject it: “It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous

222. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995). The Supreme Court in United States v. Leon
noted that “[t]he wrong condemned by the Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ by the unlawful
search or seizure itself.” 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
354 (1974)). The Court goes on to say that “the use of the fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure
‘[works] no new Fourth Amendment wrong.’” Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354).
223. Evans, 514 U.S. at 10; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) (“The question
whether the exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded
as an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to
invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.”).
224. Evans, 514 U.S. at 11; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
225. Evans, 514 U.S. at 11; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“Because I share the view that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutionally compelled corollary of
the Fourth Amendment itself . . . I see no way to avoid making an empirical judgment of this sort,
and I am satisfied that the Court has made the correct one on the information before it.”). See supra
note 92, infra notes 247, and 291–92 and accompanying text for more language from the Court
indicating that the rule is not a constitutional corollary.
226. Evans, 514 U.S. at 11 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)); see also
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
227. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 228
IV. BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE
What then of this change? How might it be initiated? The purpose of
this Part is to offer a guide for how one prosecutor in one state court
reviewing the actions of one police officer might begin to effectuate
much-needed movement away from the exclusionary rule. First, Section
A introduces the facts of the fictional case and the consequences to the
offending officer. Section B then goes through a fictional suppression
hearing based on the case, demonstrating the arguments that can be made
at pretrial for nonapplication of the exclusionary rule. Finally, Section C
demonstrates how a prosecutor, successful at the trial level, can defend
the trial court’s decision at the appellate level.
A. The Investigation and Search
Detective Todrick, 229 chief narcotics investigator for the Alpine
County Sheriff’s Department, 230 received an anonymous call that two
people were operating a methamphetamine lab from a residence in
Markleeville, California. 231 The caller specified the street address of the
house but hung up before providing any further information including the
names of the people or how the caller had come into possession of this
information.
Detective Todrick and his partner, Senior Deputy Weaver, undertook
a records check of the specified house and learned that it was purchased
by Robert and Laurel Johnson two years earlier, that Robert Johnson had
previously served ninety days in jail for being under the influence of
heroin, 232 and that he had successfully completed three years of
228. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
229. All references in this hypothetical criminal investigation, suppression hearing, and
appellate hearing are fictional.
230. Alpine County is a small, sparsely populated area located in Northern California along
the crest of the central Sierra Nevada. The county consists of snow-covered mountain peaks, high
alpine meadows, and forests. In 2004, Alpine County had a population of 1190, which is generally
concentrated in a few small communities. Most residents of Alpine County enjoy a rural lifestyle,
but the major cities of San Francisco, Sacramento, and Reno are all less than four hours away.
231. Markleeville is the county seat of Alpine County, California.
232. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11550(a) (Deering 2005) (“No person shall use, or
be under the influence of any controlled substance . . . . Any person convicted of violating this
subdivision is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90
days or more than one year in a county jail.”).
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probation. No further criminal involvement was reported on either
individual and there were no outstanding warrants. A vehicle check
revealed an older model Chevy truck registered to Robert Johnson and a
2005 Saturn registered to both Robert and Laurel Johnson.
Todrick and Weaver interviewed several neighbors living on the
same residential block as the Johnsons and learned that the Johnsons
primarily kept to themselves and had little interaction with their
neighbors. The investigators also learned that Laurel Johnson left each
weekday morning and appeared to be employed. Robert Johnson did not
leave the house often and did not appear to have outside employment.
Two twenty-four hour stakeouts revealed no unusual activity and after
several days the investigation gave way to more pressing matters.
Two months later, Detective Todrick received another anonymous
call and he recognized the voice as the same person who had made the
original call reporting the Johnsons. In an agitated voice, the speaker
said, “Bobby is cooking the hell out of that stuff, and you guys are doing
nothing.”
Todrick asked, “Who is this? How do you know that?”
The caller responded, “All you need to know is that I know these
people, and I know what they are doing, and I don’t want this happening
in my neighborhood.” He then hung up.
Three days later, Todrick, having finished other business and finding
himself in the vicinity of the Johnson neighborhood, opted to drive to the
Johnson residence. He approached the house and knocked on the door.
After getting no response, he knocked again but still received no
response. Todrick walked to the side of the house near the detached
garage and began to hear sounds emanating from the garage. Todrick
called out, “Police. Come out.” Hearing no response he called out again
in a loud voice, but received no response. He opened the six-foot side
gate abutting the garage and entered the fully fenced side and backyard
where he peered through a partially covered window in the side door of
the garage. Through the window, Detective Todrick saw a man (later
identified as Johnson) pouring a clear liquid from one container to
another. Todrick observed that the rear hatch of a truck parked in the
garage was open and he recognized that it was a mobile
methamphetamine lab. 233 Todrick pushed open the door and ordered
233. California Attorney General Bill Lockyer, Meth Labs: California’s Hidden Danger (May
2001), available at http://safestate.org/index-print.cfm?navid=240 (“Meth labs have been found in
hotels, motels, self-storage units, boats, nice homes, shabby homes, in the back of pickup trucks,
picnic baskets, ice chests, in parks, by the road and in many other places.”).
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Johnson to lie on the floor. Johnson was taken into custody and all items
in the garage associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine were
seized. 234
Alpine County Deputy District Attorney Sarah Alper reviewed
Todrick’s report concerning the Johnson arrest and seizure of the meth
lab and determined that Todrick’s actions violated the Fourth
Amendment. She believed the case against Johnson would not survive a
suppression motion; 235 however, after weighing the societal costs of
allowing a methamphetamine bootlegger to be freed and, most likely, go
on about his business, versus the nature of the Fourth Amendment
violation, Alper was reluctant to reject the case for criminal
prosecution. 236 She requested that Detective Todrick come to her office
to better determine the circumstances of the search and seizure and to
assess the detective’s mindset as he entered the side yard and looked
through the garage window.
From her interview with Todrick, Alper learned that Todrick felt
justified in entering the side yard because he had received two
anonymous phone calls accusing Johnson of maintaining a meth lab, he
had verified that Johnson had a previous narcotics conviction, he had
confirmed that Johnson did not appear to be employed outside of his
home, and because he heard noise coming from the garage but received
no response when he had announced that a police officer was present.
Todrick thought that he had probable cause to believe that there was
contraband in Johnson’s garage and that this was sufficient to get him
into the garage without a warrant. Todrick also told Alper that once he
saw the mobile lab located in the truck he was concerned that the
incriminating evidence may well be gone prior to his opportunity to

234. Id. (indicating that evidence of a meth lab includes “laboratory equipment (glass tubes,
beakers, Bunsen Burners), funnels, [e]vidence of large quantities of cold medications or nonprescription weight loss products, [a] [l]arge number of discarded blister packages or plastic bottles
with the bottoms cut out, [c]hemical cans or drums in the yard . . . [and] [f]ortifications on houses or
outbuildings, such as heavily barred windows or doors.”).
235. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(a)(1)(A) (Deering 2005) (“A defendant may move for
the return of property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result
of a search or seizure on . . . the following grounds: The search or seizure without a warrant was
unreasonable.”).
236. In California, unlike a number of other jurisdictions, all cases are presented by the
involved police agency to the prosecutor’s office. Following the presentation, the prosecutor’s office
decides whether to file charges against the suspect.
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secure a search warrant. 237 After further questioning, however, it was
clear that Todrick had no reason to believe Johnson planned to leave.
Based on her interview, D.D.A. Alper concluded that Todrick’s
actions were unintentional violations of the Fourth Amendment. 238
Furthermore, she believed that a reasonable police officer in Todrick’s
position would have known that simple probable cause was not enough
to get into a suspect’s garage without a warrant. Alper contacted the
Alpine County Sheriff’s Department and reported her conclusions that
Todrick had violated Johnson’s Fourth Amendment rights and may
benefit from additional search and seizure training. As a result of her
recommendation, the sheriff’s department suspended Todrick for two
days without pay, required him both to complete twenty hours of search
and seizure training on his own time and to successfully complete a
search and seizure examination. Todrick completed his course hours and
examination within the month.
In light of the department’s actions in sanctioning Todrick and
convinced that his errors had been unintentional, Alper felt confident that
Todrick, as a result of his sanction and additional training, would better
conform his future actions to the laws of search and seizure. Reasoning
that exclusion would serve no additional deterrent benefit, she filed
felony drug charges against Robert Johnson despite the Fourth
Amendment violations.
B. The Suppression Hearing
In response to Alper’s drug charges, Johnson’s privately retained
defense counsel, Gene Bishop, filed a motion to suppress everything
seized from the Johnson garage. He supported his motion with prevailing
search and seizure law.

237. The Supreme Court has consistently held that there is a decreased expectation of privacy
in vehicles and that because of the mobility of vehicles, police are entitled to conduct an immediate
search of a vehicle as long as there is probable cause to believe contraband is in the vehicle.
Furthermore, unlike the search incident to lawful arrest, there is no contemporaneous requirement
for a vehicle search. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Caroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that police officers
may search containers within a car as long as their search is supported by probable cause).
238. Although Todrick’s actions were unintentional violations of the Fourth Amendment,
Alper was convinced that the case did not fall under the Leon good-faith exception because a
reasonable officer in Todrick’s position would have known that more than simple probable cause
was needed to get inside Johnson’s garage. Rather than being mistaken regarding the facts, Todrick
was mistaken regarding the law in this case, and his mistaken belief was not a reasonable one.
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D.D.A. Alper filed a response to the motion, conceding that
Detective Todrick had violated Johnson’s Fourth Amendment rights by
entering the side yard and looking into the garage without first obtaining
a search warrant. 239 But, Alper argued, it would be inappropriate under
the circumstances of this case to exclude the contraband since the
offending officer had already been sanctioned, retrained, and presumably
deterred from any future violations of the Fourth Amendment. Alper’s
brief included an affidavit from Todrick in which he admitted that he was
mistaken in entering the Johnson’s yard and further that he erred in
proceeding with the search and seizure of Johnson’s garage.
Additionally, in his affidavit Todrick described his suspension and
confirmed that prior to reinstatement, he had completed twenty hours of
search and seizure training and a search and seizure examination.
Todrick further swore that as a result of the departmental sanctions, he
felt better prepared and better able to comply with the laws of search and
seizure. Alper also included an affidavit from Todrick’s superior officer,
which indicated that Todrick had, in fact, received a nonreimbursed
suspension and had successfully completed the search and seizure
training and examination.
Superior Court Judge Miles Slaughter presided at the suppression
hearing. 240
239. Detective Todrick’s actions were a violation of the Fourth Amendment because mere
probable cause is not enough to allow officers to legally enter a suspect’s home. See Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (explaining that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit police
officers from making warrantless and nonconsensual entries into a suspect’s home in order to make a
felony arrest). Instead, the police must either have a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances in
order to get into someone’s home. Exigent circumstances include hot pursuit, probable cause to
believe contraband is in the house and that the evidence is in the process of being destroyed,
protective sweep, and imminent threat to human life. See also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326
(2001) (explaining that police officers may detain a suspect for a reasonable amount of time until a
search warrant is obtained); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (explaining that police
officers may enter only to freeze a premises until a search warrant is obtained). Here, none of the
exigent circumstances were present when Detective Todrick decided to unlawfully enter the side
yard and look into Mr. Johnson’s garage.
240. B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE § 360 (3d ed. 2000).
The judge or magistrate is required to receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to
determine the motion. (P.C. 1538.5(c).) . . . . The defendant has the initial burden of
producing evidence to make out a prima facie case of an illegal search or seizure . . . .
The burden is on the prosecution to establish by a preponderance of evidence the facts
justifying a warrantless search. . . . It is defendant’s initial burden to raise a Fourth
Amendment issue, which is done by a suppression motion. Usually, the law imposes the
burden of proof on the party bringing a motion. That burden is satisfied in a suppression
motion by showing that the search was conducted without a warrant. A warrantless
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Judge Slaughter: Let the record reflect that we are on the record in
the matter of the People v. Robert Johnson. Mr. Johnson is present in
court and represented by Mr. Bishop. The People are represented by Ms.
Alper. Ms. Alper, I read your response to the 1538.5 motion. 241 Am I
correct in assuming that you are conceding that the evidence against Mr.
Johnson was illegally obtained?
Prosecutor Alper: That’s correct, your Honor, but for the reasons I
set forth in my response to defense counsel’s motion I don’t believe that
exclusion of the evidence in this case is appropriate. If I might
explain . . .
Judge Slaughter: Hold on for a moment. I need to make certain I
fully appreciate what you are asking this Court to do. Now correct me if
I’m wrong. Is it your position that despite the fact that the government is
conceding that all the evidence against the accused was the direct fruit of
an illegal search and seizure, you believe the evidence should survive a
suppression hearing?
Prosecutor: That is my position as well as the position of my office.
Defense Counsel Bishop: May I be heard?
Judge: Of course.
Defense Counsel: Judge, as you are well aware, the prosecutor’s
position flies in the face of two generations of law. 242 No less authority
than the United States Supreme Court has flat out told us that when a
Fourth Amendment violation occurs, the fruits of that violation should be
excluded. 243 What the government is seeking is unprecedented and
unwarranted.
Judge: I will agree with you that the prosecutor’s position is
unprecedented, but I’m not so certain it is unwarranted. Refusing to
exclude an entire methamphetamine lab because a detective walked into
the defendant’s yard and looked in a garage window does not necessarily
strike me as unwarranted. But, be that as it may, I’m still stuck on
unprecedented. Ms. Alper speak to that.

search is presumptively unreasonable; hence, the burden of justification [shifts to] the
prosecution. But . . . [i]t is not enough to assert the search was without a warrant;
defendant also must show that it was unreasonable.
Id.
241. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
242. The Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for use in state courts in 1961. See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also supra Part II.A.
243. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
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Prosecutor: Your Honor, going back and examining Mapp v. Ohio,
it seems fairly clear that the Supreme Court felt compelled to take strong
action in light of the particularly egregious police conduct in that
case. 244 As this Court is well aware, the overriding policy in Mapp was
deterrence from future illegal police conduct. 245 The thinking was that
excluding the evidence found as a result of police error would compel
officers to conform their future conduct to the law. 246 However, the
Mapp Court never mandated that exclusion be the sole means to that
end. 247
Judge: Is it your suggestion, Counselor, that there is some flexibility
in how courts go about enforcing the Fourth Amendment?
Prosecutor: Judge, the goal is police deterrence. If we can deter
future violations in some way that doesn’t have the extreme
consequences of exclusion, shouldn’t we try?

244. See id. at 644 (describing the officers as being in “defiance of the law”). The Court also
went into an extensive discussion of the facts surrounding Ms. Mapp’s arrest, something the Court
did not do in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) when it refused to apply the exclusionary rule to
the states. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644–45. Moreover, the Court noted that the government, which is
charged with enforcing the law, should not be allowed to become a lawbreaker. Id. at 659. In
concluding its decision, the Court refused to permit the Fourth Amendment’s protections to “remain
an empty promise.” Id. at 660.
245. Id. at 656 (noting that the “purpose of the . . . rule ‘is to deter’” (quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960))). Furthermore, the Court said that the federal exclusionary rule
was designed to be a “deterrent safeguard.” Id. at 648.
246. Id. at 656 (stating that the exclusionary rule was meant “to deter—to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to
disregard it” (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217)). The Court believed that officers had an incentive to
violate constitutional rights and that this disregard for personal liberties could be prevented through
the use of the exclusionary rule because nothing else seemed to be working. Id. at 652–53.
247. In Mapp, the Court never stated that the use of an exclusionary rule was the only method
states could use to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Mapp Court merely believed,
without the support of any reliable statistical evidence, that it was the only effective deterrent. Id. at
651–52. Furthermore, in his concurring opinion Justice Black reiterated his belief “that the Federal
exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of
evidence which Congress might negate.” Id. at 661 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black had
previously expressed this view in his concurring opinion in Wolf, 338 U.S. at 39–40 (Black, J.,
concurring). Furthermore, in the majority opinion of Wolf, the Court seemed to be suggesting that
Congress should take action regarding the exclusionary rule. See id. at 33. For example, the Court’s
opinion ends with the following curious statement: “And though we have interpreted the Fourth
Amendment to forbid the admission of such evidence, a different question would be presented if
Congress under its legislative powers were to pass a statute purporting to negate the Weeks
doctrine.” Id.
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Defense Counsel: By what authority? Since Mapp, every trial court
in every state has excluded the fruit of bad searches, 248 and here this
prosecutor is asking this Court to go directly against, what, forty, fortyfive years of precedent. Judge, this is ludicrous and should be rejected
out of hand.
Prosecutor: May I?
Judge: Go ahead.
Prosecutor: Thank you. If I might, I would like to step back. Justice
Blackmun in his concurring opinion in the Leon case in 1984 suggested
that “the scope of the exclusionary rule is subject to change in light of
changing judicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the
confines of the courtroom.” 249 I want to suggest . . .
Judge: Ms. Alper, excuse me, but is that a call you want me to
make? Isn’t that more appropriately decided at the appellate level?
Prosecutor: With all due respect, Your Honor, the appellate courts
need something to work with. Why not this case? We don’t have
egregious police conduct, we have unintentional error. The effects of
exclusion would work a grave hardship on justice if this defendant, a
man engaged in the wholesale manufacturer and distribution of a
dangerous and illegal drug, is allowed to walk away from his conduct,
free to set up shop in some other neighborhood.
Judge: Well, without getting into the nature of the police
misconduct, I will suggest that excluding evidence probative of a crime
is something I have always been loath to do. But I still come back to the
same basic question: what authority does a lone trial judge, sitting in a
small, rural, northern California county, have to break with the U.S.
Supreme Court?
Prosecutor: The Supreme Court has never mandated exclusion as
the sole remedy. 250 What the Court has stated is that law enforcement
248. Defense Counsel Bishop’s statement here is not completely correct. While the Court has
kept the exclusionary rule since 1961, it has varied considerably regarding the situations in which the
rule will apply. See supra Part II.B.
249. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
250. See supra note 92 and infra note 262; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence
obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes
makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure “[works] no new
Fourth Amendment wrong.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354, 94 S.Ct. 613,
623, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). The wrong condemned by the Amendment is “fully
accomplished” by the unlawful search or seizure itself, and the exclusionary rule is
neither intended nor able to “cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has
already suffered.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048, 49 L.Ed.2d
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officials need to be deterred from future violations. 251 That is the
essence of Mapp, and I am suggesting that in this case, you can
accomplish that goal without resorting to exclusion.
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, Mapp created a level of individual
protection and the prosecutor’s proposal falls below that minimal level of
protection guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 252
Prosecutor: Counsel misinterprets the nature of the exclusionary
rule. The rule is simply a remedy, not a right or a liberty. 253 The affected
right or liberty is freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; there
is no right to have evidence excluded. 254
Judge: Moving back to the question of whether a trial court has the
authority to do as you propose, shouldn’t such a departure from the
accepted practice come from the Supreme Court itself or through
legislative channels?
Prosecutor: Taking the questions in turn. As I’ve already suggested,
the Supreme Court never mandated exclusion as the sole remedy. 255
Should this Court find that the deterrence policy of Mapp was met, the
Court has fulfilled its obligation under Mapp. 256 As for legislation, the
1067 (1976). The rule thus operates as a “judicially created remedy” designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. United States v. Calandra, supra, 414
U.S., at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 620.
Id. at 906.
251. See supra notes 72–87 and accompanying text for a summary of the Court’s rationale in
Mapp.
252. The Defense Counsel is incorrect in assuming that Mapp created an individual level of
protection guaranteed by the Due Process Clause because the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional
right. The rule is merely a remedy designed to deter the violation of individual constitutional rights.
See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (“Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never
been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
persons. As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.”).
253. Id.
254. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
255. See supra note 92 and infra note 262.
256. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984). The Court states that “suppression of
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in
those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” Id.
Furthermore, the Court continued by stating that
[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then
evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
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exclusionary rule was a judicial creation and, as suggested by Justice
Blackman, it “is subject to change in light of changing judicial
understanding.” 257
Judge Slaughter, we know a lot more than we did in 1961 about
whether this bold exclusion experiment would deter the police. And what
we have learned is that because of the indirect nature of the sanction, it is
largely ineffectual as a deterrent. 258
Defense Counsel: Judge, I took the liberty, in preparation for this
hearing, to read some of the studies discussed in the People’s brief, and I
am unconvinced that we have evidence that the exclusionary rule has
failed to deter police misconduct. 259 Several authors of the various
studies were candid and remarked that determining human motivations in
such a complex endeavor is difficult and uncertain. 260
Prosecutor: Your Honor, Mr. Bishop has it half right. Testing is
difficult, but the studies, while not completely conclusive, do not support
the idea that the exclusionary rule accomplishes the goal of future police
deterrence. 261 Because the rule does nothing to directly sanction police
officers, it does not seem to accomplish what the Court had hoped for,
and yet the criminal justice system is left holding the bag when probative
and incriminating evidence of guilt is blocked from trial. Judge, the

Id. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)); see also Arizona v. Evans,
514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) (citing Janis, 428 U.S. at 454); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454
(1976) (“If . . . the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in
the instant situation is unwarranted.”).
257. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
258. See supra Part II.C. Some of the studies actually found that instead of deterring police
misconduct, the rule works to encourage police perjury in order to avoid suppression of valuable
evidence. Furthermore, because the rule’s harsh effects fall mainly on the prosecutor, one study
found that eighteen percent of officers surveyed believed the rule was a minimal concern or no
concern at all. See Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 721.
259. See Orfield, supra note 11, at 1033–34. See also supra note 169 and accompanying text
for findings indicating that officers do learn when evidence they have seized is excluded and that
they generally understand the basis for such suppression. See also Orfield, supra note 11, at 1017,
1039 (stating that the exclusionary rule “has educated police officers in the requirements of the
fourth amendment”); Effect of Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 136, at 102 (noting that police departments
increased their post-academy training efforts).
260. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties
surrounding any study that attempts to gauge the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule.
261. See Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 710–11 (stating that most of the studies “strongly
undermine support for the exclusionary rule as a cost-effective deterrent for police misconduct”); see
also Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11, at 345–50 (citing a high percentage of officers who would
violate Fourth Amendment law).
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victim here is society because the defendant will be free to go back into
the community and once again go about his awful business.
Judge: Moving back to the central question, what message am I
sending to law enforcement if I turn a blind eye to the officer’s illegal
conduct?
Defense Counsel: That’s exactly right judge, if courts don’t exclude
this tainted evidence there is no sanction for police misconduct. The
Fourth Amendment is, once again, left unprotected just as it was prior to
Mapp, and, once again, the police will be free to trample the rights of
citizens.
I am required to point out that what the prosecutor is asking this
Court to do is unprecedented and should be rejected out of hand.
Prosecutor: Why should my proposal be rejected out of hand?
Aren’t we dealing with serious enough issues that merit thoughtful
dialogue? Before this Court excludes evidence of an entire
methamphetamine lab, isn’t it worth several moments of everyone’s time
to see if there is some better way to protect Fourth Amendment
guarantees than such an odious and extreme approach?
I would like to turn back to a question Your Honor proposed about
what kind of message this Court would be sending to law enforcement if
you did not exclude this evidence. First of all, you would not be turning a
blind eye to police misconduct. If anything, judges like you would
become integral to a process whereby we actually do something to
remediate police behavior so that they will, in fact, comport their conduct
to the law. Instead of excluding evidence, which as we all know works
only in the most indirect way against the involved officers, this Court
would examine what direct actions have been taken against the officer to
better ensure that there will be compliance in the future. For instance, in
this case the officer was suspended without pay. Additionally, his
department mandated he engage in twenty hours of search and seizure
law training on his own time and then successfully complete an exam on
search and seizure before he was allowed to resume his duties. Your
Honor, these are direct consequences of the officer’s behavior. These
sanctions provide a real incentive for him to act according to the law in
the future. If, on the other hand, the Court feels the officer’s department
has not done enough to ensure future compliance from the offending
officer, you reserve the power to suggest further sanctions or to simply
exclude the evidence on a case-by-case basis.
Let’s compare this scenario with the “typical” case where the officer
testifies at the suppression hearing, the evidence is excluded and
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everyone goes on about their business. The offending officer may or may
not even learn of the ruling, and even if he does, he most likely will
shrug it off as just another instance of the screwed up criminal justice
system. Judge, you can make a difference.
Judge: I must say I am impressed by the actions of the department in
this case. It shows a commitment to the rule of law and I agree with you,
Ms. Alper, that there is a very real disincentive for this officer to engage
in this type of behavior in the future.
Defense Counsel: Excuse me, Judge, but I couldn’t disagree more. Is
that the response to police misconduct—whenever there is a threat of
losing evidence let’s just give the officer some days off and save the
case? How disingenuous is that? Is the Fourth Amendment to be trifled
with?
Prosecutor: Judge, under Mapp as it stands, it is for you to
determine whether the remedial actions of the involved department are
genuine. If you determine that there is no departmental commitment to
better train and discipline officers, exclusion is always your prerogative.
What I suggest is that under this approach, law enforcement agencies
will feel that they are directly accountable for their officer’s actions, and
the departments themselves will now have a greater incentive for their
officers to do the job right.
Judge: So under your scheme, trial judges are put in the position of
determining whether departmental sanctions against offending officers
are sufficient to induce officers to comply with the law?
Prosecutor: Yes, Your Honor. The goal here is to ensure officer
compliance. What better way than to bring the involved police agencies
into the equation? If the agency has done a poor job of hiring or training
its officers, that agency must bear the brunt of public criticism. When a
judge, convinced that an officer and his department are not committed to
following the law, is forced to exclude evidence, public criticism and
public pressure will focus on the police agency instead of the judge. We
are creating an environment where those in the best position to ensure
lawful police conduct are held accountable.
Judge: Speaking for myself and other judges who are occasionally in
the difficult position of having to exclude relevant and probative
evidence, I appreciate shifting the responsibility for proper police
behavior from the courts, who can have only an indirect impact, to the
law enforcement agencies, who can directly impact officer behavior.
Defense Counsel: So under this scheme, the court is going to
become the de facto supervisor of the police departments?
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Prosecutor: Not at all. During the hearing, the court would first
determine if the proffered evidence was obtained as a result of Fourth
Amendment violation. If it was, the judge will receive evidence as to
what, if any, remedial action has been instituted to ensure future
compliance. If the judge is satisfied, the evidence is not excluded. If the
judge is not satisfied, he or she can exclude and point the finger of
responsibility directly to the involved agency.
Judge: I am still troubled by the fact that the approach you are
suggesting would apply the exclusionary rule to only certain instances of
police misconduct, but not all instances.
Prosecutor: Your Honor, the Supreme Court has drawn such
distinctions. As you recall from the Leon case, the Court looked at the
nature of the error and determined that reasonable good faith error should
not result in exclusion. 262
Judge: But as I also recall from Leon, the Court determined that the
judge authorizing the search warrant erred, not the police. 263
Prosecutor: You are absolutely right, Judge. Consequently, in Leon
the evidence was not excluded because exclusion would have in no way
deterred the police because it was the judge who erred. 264
Judge: But you are not suggesting that Detective Todrick made a
good faith error here are you?
Prosecutor: No.
Judge: Rather you are suggesting here that since police misconduct
in this case was not intentional but was unreasonable, your proposed
remedy would be appropriate. Why draw distinctions between the types
262. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907–08.
Particularly when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith . . . the
magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of
the criminal justice system. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 490, 96 S.Ct., at 3051.
Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, therefore, may well “generat[e]
disrespect for the law and administration of justice.” Id. at 491, 96 S.Ct., at 3051.
Accordingly, “[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served.” United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 U.S., at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 670; see Stone v.
Powell, supra, 428 U.S., at 486–487, 96 S.Ct., at 3048–3049; United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 447, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3028, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976).
Id. at 908. The Leon court goes on to suggest that “the exclusionary rule be more generally modified
to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or
seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 909 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 255 (1983) (White, J., concurring)).
263. See id. at 903.
264. See id. at 921 (“Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own,
cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.”).
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of police misconduct? Isn’t Fourth Amendment error Fourth Amendment
error?
Prosecutor: Your question goes to the central issue here—the issue
of deterrence. I am suggesting that officers who have unintentionally
violated a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights would appear to be better
candidates to learn from their mistakes and conform their conduct to the
Fourth Amendment than those officers who intentionally engage in
misconduct. It could be that direct intradepartment sanctions and
reeducation could remediate both those who unintentionally and
intentionally err. But that is not an issue we need to resolve in this case
because I believe Detective Todrick unreasonably thought that, under the
circumstances, he was justified in stepping into the side yard and looking
through the window.
The goal of the exclusionary rule is to give teeth to the Fourth
Amendment by deterring police misconduct. Detective Todrick suffered
direct sanctions and he is now deterred from future mistakes. He is on
notice, as are the rest of the officers in his department, that violations
will be met with significant sanctions. The entire department has a real
incentive to do it right the next time around. Judge, the Fourth
Amendment is in fact better protected in this case than under the old,
tried, and failed approach of Mapp.
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, may I be heard?
Judge: Mr. Bishop, I’m pretty sure I know what you are going to say
but my mind is made up. I am going to do something that may well draw
rebuke from my colleagues at the appellate level. I am denying the
defense motion to suppress the evidence despite the Fourth Amendment
violations that led to that evidence.
Defense Counsel: Your Honor is forcing me to take a writ. 265
265. WITKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 240, § 378(1).
If the motion [to suppress evidence] is denied after a special hearing requested by the
defendant, the defendant may obtain pretrial review by petitioning for a writ of
mandamus . . . .
....
In felony cases, the appellate court reviews the action of the superior court at the
special hearing, rather than that of the magistrate at the preliminary examination. Thus,
the defendant, in seeking review by writ, should furnish the appellate court with a
transcript of the evidence presented at the special hearing and advise the court of the
motion and the grounds on which it was made.
Id. (internal citations omitted). However, this requirement is not applied where “(a) the motion was
submitted on the basis of the preliminary examination transcript (which had furnished the basis for
the P.C. 1538.5 motion at the special hearing), and (b) the defendant specifically described the
illegally seized evidence.” Id.
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Judge: I am fully aware of that, Mr. Bishop. You must do what you
must do.
I will make the following factual findings to assist in appellate
review. I find based on the sworn affidavit of Detective Todrick that his
errors in entering the side yard of Mr. Johnson’s residence, looking
through the garage window, and then entering the garage were
unintentionally violative of the Fourth Amendment. Further, I find the
sanctions imposed by Detective Todrick’s department, which included
suspension without pay, twenty hours of search and seizure training, and
a requirement that Detective Todrick successfully complete a search and
seizure examination, convince me that Detective Todrick and others in
his department are less likely to engage in conduct that violates the
Fourth Amendment in the future.
Therefore I am denying the defense motion to exclude the materials
taken from the garage and order that a time be set for trial.
C. The Appellate Argument
The Third California Appellate District. Justice E.A. Harris
presiding, with Justices Anthony McPeak and Edith May.
Clerk: The People of the State of California v. Robert Johnson, on a
writ brought by Robert Johnson.
Justice Harris: Mr. Bishop, welcome and good morning. I
understand we have a rather intriguing question before us today.
Defense Counsel Bishop: “Intriguing” is certainly one view of this
matter, Your Honor. However, from my perspective there is no
legitimate question before this court. As I have set forth in my brief, the
trial judge erred in agreeing with the prosecutor’s unprecedented notion
that evidence seized in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment should
not be suppressed.
Justice Harris: I’m well aware of the question before this court, Mr.
Bishop, and I must confess that when I first read the briefs I was very
skeptical of the actions of the trial court. On further reflection, however,
I believe it is a question certainly worthy of further discussion.
Defense Counsel: I appreciate the Court’s intrigue and respectfully
suggest that the sophistry suggested by the prosecutor be aired out in
academic pieces and law review articles. 266 We are in the real world, and

266. In addition to those scholars who use academic pieces and law review articles to criticize
the exclusionary rule, a number of scholars also defend the rule. One of those most notable scholars
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in the real world, the fruits of illegal searches and seizures are
excluded. 267 The Supreme Court set it forth in Mapp v. Ohio and has not
varied from its course for four decades. 268
Justice Harris: Counsel, this Court deals in the real world every
day. This Court makes difficult decisions every day. Often times these
decisions have significant effects on the lives of the people before this
Court. I consider the actions of the trial judge in this instance to be
carefully considered, and his actions will be scrutinized with care. So, I
suggest that we turn to a thoughtful discussion of this serious question.
First of all, Mr. Bishop, the Supreme Court has varied regarding the
exclusionary rule’s application, a fact of which you should be well
aware. Now, as we begin our discussion of this important issue, Mr.
Bishop, isn’t the state correct in asserting that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct 269 and, in this case, given
the direct sanctions and re-education of the erring officer, won’t he be
motivated to perform better in the future?
Defense Counsel: The Mapp Court imposed the exclusionary rule on
state courts not only to deter police violations of the Fourth Amendment
but also to preserve judicial integrity. 270 This latter goal would be
completely sacrificed if illegally obtained evidence is allowed in a court
of law.
Justice McPeak: You’ve picked an interesting place to begin your
argument, Counsel. Are you suggesting that judicial integrity is a
foundational cornerstone of the exclusionary rule? Because from my
reading of Mapp, it appears to be on the periphery, while the focus is
squarely on police deterrence. 271
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, allowing ill-begotten evidence to be
admitted into court taints and sullies our system of justice.
is Yale Kamisar. See Yale Kamisar, Law and Truth: Debate: Exclusionary Rules: In Defense of the
Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2003).
267. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
268. See supra Part II.B. Defense Counsel Bishop’s statement here is not completely correct.
While the Supreme Court has kept the exclusionary rule since 1961, it has varied considerably
regarding the situations in which it will apply.
269. See supra Part II.A.
270. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (stating that the Court’s decision gives “to the courts . . . that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice”). However, given the Court’s
concern with the police violating Fourth Amendment rights, it is clear that the main focus of the
Mapp opinion was that something was needed in order to deter future violations of the Fourth
Amendment by the police. See discussion supra Part II.A.
271. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. See supra notes 72–87 and accompanying text for a summary of
the Court’s decision in Mapp.
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Justice McPeak: Counsel, some might suggest that excluding highly
incriminating and probative evidence of a defendant’s guilt taints and
sullies our justice system. Be that as it may, let me ask again: is it your
position that judicial integrity is the primary goal of the exclusionary
rule?
Defense Counsel: Judicial integrity was certainly an important
consideration . . .
Justice McPeak: I sense you are hedging, Counsel. Wouldn’t you
agree that the Supreme Court’s prime motivation for ordering exclusion
in Mapp was to deter police from search and seizure violations?
Defense Counsel: I would agree that deterrence was the prime
motivation but that the concern about judicial integrity was significant as
well.
Justice McPeak: Thank you, Counsel. Let’s talk about deterrence.
One of the time-honored criticisms of the exclusionary rule is that it does
not impose direct sanctions against the offending officer and, thus, there
is no great disincentive for police noncompliance. 272 How do you
respond to that criticism?
Defense Counsel: It has been said that the police are advocates in
the criminal justice system and are very much concerned in seeing that
the people they arrest are convicted. 273 There is an “us against them”
mentality. Given that adversarial role, having evidence excluded is
hurtful to their position and thus creates a very real incentive to comply
with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment to avoid losing that evidence
and ultimately the conviction. 274
Justice May: You make a good argument, Counsel. It is a real slap
in the face of law enforcement to lose convictions. Oftentimes officers
have put themselves at risk to secure the very evidence that is later being
excluded. However, wouldn’t you also agree that there may be instances
where the police simply want to get drugs or weapons off the street?

272. Perrin et al., supra note 11 at 675–76 (discussing how the sanction of exclusion “falls
most directly on the prosecutor” instead of the offending officer).
273. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (“The judicial warrant has a
significant role to play in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a
more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement
officer ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948))).
274. Perrin et al., supra note 11 at 679–80 (noting that the police officers in Orfield’s study
felt a personal sense of disappointment at the loss of a potential conviction). The responses of the
officers in Orfield’s study are significant in that, if sincere, they demonstrate an incentive for the
police to comply with the Fourth Amendment.
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Defense Counsel: There may be instances in which officers have a
stronger incentive to get the contraband off the street, but I’m hardpressed to believe that officers who work hard to gain evidence,
sometimes even at the risk of their own safety, are disinterested in
securing convictions. They very much care, and when a court throws out
hard-earned, incriminating evidence, they feel it both personally and
professionally.
Justice McPeak: Your observations sound anecdotal, Counsel.
Nonetheless, you would agree that exclusion is not a direct sanction
against the offending officers, and while they may be chagrined at having
evidence excluded and perhaps losing convictions, they suffer no direct
professional consequences. It seems to me that direct sanctions would
create a better incentive to comply with the law.
Defense Counsel: I would agree with your proposition that direct
sanctions would be a strong motivator. However, as I set forth in my
brief, direct sanctions will not work because they would have a chilling
effect on law enforcement. 275 If an officer is concerned that even
unintentional error may result in fines, suspension, or even termination,
the officer may be reluctant to do the job he or she was hired to do.
Your Honors, the exclusionary rule strikes a delicate balance. On the
one hand, it provides an incentive for law enforcement to obey the law
by threatening the convictions they seek and care a great deal about. On
the other hand, the potential sanction is not so severe that it might
impede an officer’s ability to do his or her job.
Justice McPeak: Mr. Bishop, according to some of the empirical
studies cited in opposing counsel’s brief, there is little to suggest that
exclusion of evidence really works a disincentive on law enforcement. In
fact, the studies tend to indicate that on occasion the offending officer
doesn’t even learn that his conduct was found wanting and that the
evidence was excluded. If that’s the case, how does the rule deter?
Defense Counsel: The People have put great stock in some of the
studies they rely on. I would like to point out that the majority of the
authors of those studies cautioned specifically that definitive conclusions
in evaluating the human motivation in such complex settings are very
difficult and uncertain. 276 Furthermore, two of the three studies cited by
275. See Perrin, et al., supra note 11, at 681 (“Ninety-five percent of the responding officers
said that if victims could sue officers, it would have a chilling effect on the officers’ ability to do
their job.”).
276. See Oaks, supra note 136, for one author’s remarks concerning the difficulties in
understanding the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent. See also Elkins v. United
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the prosecutor found that the exclusionary rule does in fact deter officers
from illegal conduct. 277 That being said, I don’t know how much faith
we can put in these studies. In my considerable experience, the police are
very aware when evidence is suppressed. And, I might add, they are
always upset.
Justice Harris: Once again, Mr. Bishop, while this court appreciates
your considerable experience, your observations are anecdotal, bordering
on gratuitous. I would like to turn your attention to another problem that
I see with the exclusionary rule. In fact, it is a problem that has surfaced
in the very case before us today. The problem is disproportionality. 278 In
this case the officer’s error was walking into the defendant’s backyard
and looking through a garage window, which was in clear violation of
Mr. Johnson’s Fourth Amendment rights. The sanction is the lost
prosecution of a person allegedly engaged in the manufacture of illegal,
highly addictive, and dangerous drugs. Would exclusion of the
methamphetamine lab and all the contraband found in that lab be
disproportionate to the nature of the police error? 279
Defense Counsel: The violation of the sanctity of the home
constitutes a serious breach of the Fourth Amendment. The home and
those places just outside the home where the family engages in intimate

States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) (“Since as a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative, it
is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be assembled. For much the same reason, it
cannot positively be demonstrated that enforcement of the criminal law is either more or less
effective under either rule.”).
277. See Orfield, supra note 11, at 1054; Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 11, at 358 (noting
that the exclusionary rule has a weak deterrent effect).
278. See Lawrence Buser, Drug Bust Is Erased by Judge—Says Suspect With 33 Pounds of
Cocaine Not Nervous Enough, COM. APPEAL, May 21, 2005, at B1. Buser cited a recent case in
which an officer pulled over a car for speeding, noticed that the driver seemed unusually nervous,
requested and obtained written permission to search his car, and then discovered thirty-three pounds
of cocaine. However, the judge, after watching the dashboard video of the incident, ruled that the
cocaine was inadmissible because the suspect was not “nervous enough to become a suspicious
character worthy of further investigation” and that the officer’s “detention was a process designed to
exploit the underlying traffic stop.” Id.
279. See Yale Kamisar, “Comparative Reprehensibility” and the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1987). Some critics argue,
When proponents of the proportionality approach (or “inadvertent” police error
exception) complain that rigid application of the exclusionary rule offends the idea of
proportionality, they have in mind those instances when an “honest” or “inadvertent”
police blunder affords a guilty defendant—any guilty defendant—an unacceptable
windfall. These critics of the exclusionary rule point to the disparity or disproportion
between the police error and the “drastic” remedy of exclusion.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added); see also infra notes 281–83 and accompanying text.
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activities are among the most protected and private areas imaginable. 280
Surely the court is not suggesting that Detective Todrick’s violation was
merely of a technical nature.
Justice Harris: Bear with me, Counsel. Would you agree with me
that illegal police behavior can be characterized on different levels of
fault? For instance, in the Mapp case the police fully recognized that they
needed a search warrant to enter Mapp’s home, but they entered without
a warrant anyway. 281 Then, while engaged in their illegal and invasive
search of her home, they compounded their error by denying Mapp
access to her attorney who was present but kept from her. 282 As a result
of the illegal police conduct, they found several allegedly pornographic
pictures. 283 So it seems we had terrible, perhaps even egregious police
conduct resulting in the seizure of some dirty pictures. I’ve often
wondered in the Mapp case itself, if the evidence found had involved a
murder or rape instead of dirty pictures, would the Court have suppressed
that evidence. Extreme police conduct, minimal offense. In the case
before us here today, Detective Todrick incorrectly, but unintentionally
thought he was justified in entering through the gate, looking into the
garage, and then entering the garage. As a result he discovered an entire
methamphetamine lab. While his conduct violated Johnson’s expectation
of privacy, it was nowhere near the extreme or knowingly violative
misconduct in Mapp. In addition to nonegregious police misconduct, we
have here a very serious crime. Would it be disproportionate, Mr.
Bishop, to exclude an entire methamphetamine lab because on this error?
Defense Counsel: The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable
search and seizures. It does not distinguish between more unreasonable
as opposed to less unreasonable search and seizures but prohibits them
completely.

280. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that aiming a thermalimaging device, that was not in general public use, at the home constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment). In protecting the home as a sanctuary, Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, stated that “[t]o be sure, the homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy
concerning what takes place within the home, and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
physical invasions of the home should apply to their functional equivalent.” Id. at 44.
281. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961). When the officers arrived at Dollree
Mapp’s house they demanded entry, but were refused because they did not have a warrant. Because
the police did not have Mapp’s consent and there were no exigent circumstances that would justify
entry into her home without a warrant, they undertook surveillance of the home. After waiting a few
more hours, the police forced their way into Mapp’s home, this time claiming to have a warrant. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 645.
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Justice Harris: Precisely. There is no gradation. Rather, it is a onesize-fits-all approach. So regardless of the level of police misconduct, the
same remedy is applied. Wouldn’t you agree that this approach can and
does lead to disproportionality?
Defense Counsel: Are we now to distinguish between greater or
lesser unreasonable searches? I’m not at all certain the Framers of the
Bill of Rights or the Mapp Court had that in mind. The police conduct is
either violative of the Fourth Amendment or it is not, and, if it is, the
fruits of that violation should be excluded.
Justice Harris: It seems to me though, that there clearly are
gradations of police misconduct and that excluding an entire meth lab
because of unintentional, nonegregious error, such as we have before us
here, seems disproportionate to the nature of the error.
Justice McPeak: Excuse me, Mr. Bishop, but I want to follow-up on
Justice Harris’ question. It has been set forth in the state’s brief that
officers whose error is unintentional, as compared to those whose
conduct is knowingly violative, would be good candidates for additional
search and seizure training, and that once the training is completed, they
would perform better the next time around. Conversely, an officer who
knows he or she is violating a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights and
does so with impunity most likely will not benefit from further training.
If this proposition is true, shouldn’t we look more closely at the nature of
the police conduct?
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I’m not willing to concede that we
can distinguish between levels of police misconduct or that additional
search and seizure training will deter misconduct. Furthermore, if we
attempt to determine whether an officer knowingly violated the Fourth
Amendment, how would we go about it? Wouldn’t we be forced to probe
the subjective intent of the officer? 284 That would seem to open up a
whole series of problems including a motivation for officers to perjure
themselves in order to avoid the type of direct sanction the state is
suggesting. 285
284. The Supreme Court has struggled with whether it is appropriate, or even possible, to
probe the subjective intent of an officer’s mind. Compare Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996) (holding that pretextual traffic stops are acceptable because courts cannot probe an officer’s
subjective intent), with South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976) (holding that an
impounded vehicle may be inventoried as long as it is done according to routine administrative
caretaking functions so that the police cannot use the inventory as a way around the probable cause
requirements).
285. See Orfield, supra note 11, at 1050 (stating that almost all officers surveyed admitted that
police occasionally lie in suppression hearings). Thus, if officers lie now to avoid the indirect
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Justice May: You make a good point, Counsel. The two significant
problems I see with the state’s proposition are an increased incentive for
the police to commit perjury to protect themselves from direct sanction
and the chilling effect on police officers as they go about their jobs.
Defense Counsel: Precisely. Part of the rationale for this radical
proposal suggested by the state is that the exclusionary rule creates an
incentive for the police to commit perjury in order to avoid exclusion of
evidence. Yet by going to these more direct sanctions, the motivation for
officers to lie is tremendously enhanced. If, indeed, police perjury is
currently a concern, it will be a full-blown problem if we radically
increase the incentive to lie. An officer faced with the threat of losing a
week’s pay, or, worse yet, his job, will really be backed into a corner.
Under such circumstances we are creating a compelling incentive for
perjury. For this reason alone, the state’s proposal should be rejected.
I would also like to follow up on Justice May’s observation about the
chilling effect this proposal would have on law enforcement. Officers
would most likely go about their jobs differently if concerned with the
possibility of suspension or termination. There would be secondguessing and equivocation. I am suggesting to this court that an officer
concerned about such external matters will be dramatically less effective
in the field.
Justice Harris: Don’t we want officers to be more thoughtful and
even protective of individual liberties as they go about their jobs?
Defense Counsel: Of course we do, but we don’t want officers so
overly concerned with personal sanction that they become virtually
ineffective in going about their jobs.
Justice Harris: That is certainly a question worthy of asking
opposing counsel. I see we are almost out of time so let me turn to a last
area of inquiry. Given the studies as well as pronouncements from
individual Supreme Court Justices suggesting there is scant evidence that
the rule deters the police, 286 shouldn’t we look at other approaches?
Aren’t we obligated to try something else?

sanction of exclusion they will undoubtedly be more likely to lie if a direct sanction were imposed
upon them. See also Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 725 (stating that many officers minimized the
extent of police perjury that they had witnessed, while a few officers claimed to have heard of police
perjury as many as ten, twenty, or even fifty times).
286. See supra Part II.C for a summary of the lack of evidence that the exclusionary rule
actually deters police misconduct. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that there is “no empirical evidence to support the
claim that the rule actually deters illegal conduct of law enforcement officials”).
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Defense Counsel: If these studies are to be taken at face value—and,
as I’ve already said, I do not subscribe to those conclusions—but if they
are to be taken at face value, and we do need to rethink how we as a
society enforce the Fourth Amendment, then let us go about it in a more
deliberative and thoughtful manner than suggested by the prosecutor.
Instead of some half-baked response because we face the exclusion of
some serious evidence in this one case, let’s allow our legislators to take
action or let’s allow our Supreme Court to strike out on some new
course. Not like this.
Justice Harris: Thank you, Counsel.
Defense Counsel: May I conclude?
Justice Harris: I’m sorry Mr. Bishop, you are out of time. We
would like to hear from the state.
Ms. Alper, good morning. You and your office have undertaken
quite a challenge. The exclusionary rule has been one of the mainstays of
the criminal justice system for nearly a century. 287 Its operation is a
virtual given: the police err and the evidence is out. 288 It seems settled
and fixed. While there may be instances when the rule exacts a painful
cost, isn’t it for the most part reasonably effective at keeping law
enforcement in line? Is this something that we can, or even should, go
back and recast?
Prosecutor Alper: Justice Harris, I’m glad you choose to start here.
We need to acknowledge that the exclusionary rule has become part of
the fixed universe of the criminal justice system. Two generations of
lawyers have been educated on the inviolate nature of exclusion in the
event of police error. 289 There is typically no discussion of whether any
particular exclusion works to society’s benefit—we simply argue at
suppression hearing whether there was police error and if so the fruits of
the error are simply out. It is a knee-jerk reaction. What I would like this
court to do is think long and hard about the exclusionary rule, why we
instituted it in the first place, and whether it does what it was supposed to
do.
I realize this is bold and very unusual, but I also know that any long
held maxim should be able to withstand rigorous scrutiny and
287. See supra Part II. The Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule in 1914, over 90 years
ago. Furthermore, the Court adopted the federal rule for use in state courts in 1961. Therefore, the
exclusionary rule, whether used in federal courts only or in both federal and state courts, has been
part of the criminal justice system for 92 years.
288. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
289. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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examination. Your Honor, I do not believe the exclusionary rule can
withstand such scrutiny.
Justice Harris: Well before we even get to a scrutiny of the viability
of the rule, it seems to me there is the threshold question of whether this
court and the trial court are even proper venues for what you are seeking.
After all, it seems to me that you are asking us to depart from the United
States Supreme Court in its Mapp opinion.
Prosecutor: Neither in Mapp nor in any subsequent opinion
exploring the parameters of Mapp has the Supreme Court ever mandated
that the sole or exclusive remedy for police error was exclusion of the
evidence that was the byproduct of that error. 290 In fact, in his
concurring opinion Justice Black states that he agrees with the majority’s
implication “that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the
Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which
Congress might negate.” 291 Furthermore, in adopting the good faith
exception in Leon, the Court stated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment
contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained
in violation of its commands.” 292 I believe Mapp is a case where the
Court, exasperated with the police continually and knowingly running
roughshod over the rights of citizens, took the best course of action they
could identify at the time. 293 Over the forty-five years since that
decision, we have had calls from members of the Court to consider
reexamination of the rule if evidence exclusion was not accomplishing
the goal of police deterrence. 294

290. See supra notes 92, 250, 252, and 256.
291. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
39–40 (1949)).
292. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
293. See supra notes 72–87 and accompanying text for a summary of the Court’s opinion in
Mapp.
294. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting a gradual trend in Supreme
Court decisions to admit illegally seized evidence); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“If an effective alternative remedy is available,
concern for official observance of the law does not require adherence to the exclusionary rule.”)
(emphasis added). Chief Justice Burger also implied that he would be willing to consider another
approach when he stated that he “would hesitate to abandon [the exclusionary rule] until some
meaningful substitute is developed.” Id. at 415. The Chief Justice also suggested that perhaps, if the
Court would not take action, Congress should step in. Id. at 421 (“Reasonable and effective
substitutes can be formulated if Congress would take the lead . . . .”); see also Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) (“Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant. It deprives society of its
remedy against one lawbreaker because he has been pursued by another. It protects one against
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Justice McPeak: But shouldn’t that decision come from the
legislature?
Prosecutor: The exclusionary rule was a creation of the judiciary.
Can’t the judiciary change or modify what it wrought?
Justice McPeak: We are a state appellate court, and yet you are
suggesting that we can overrule a decision of the United States Supreme
Court.
Prosecutor: It would be foolish and fruitless to suggest that. Rather,
I am suggesting that to follow the course I’ve outlined in my brief in no
way overrules Mapp. Mapp has never been absolute. If the reason for the
existence of the exclusionary rule does not reflect the realities of the
criminal justice system, then courts have the power to so find.
If this court in this instance believes that because Detective Todrick
was sanctioned and reeducated he will be deterred from future Fourth
Amendment violations, then we have accomplished everything the Court
in Mapp sought to accomplish without excluding the probative
incriminating evidence.
Justice May: Can you cite to any other instances where a lower
court broke from long standing Supreme Court precedent because the
lower court determined that the policy was wrong?
Prosecutor: I think we have a very good example in the Supreme
Court’s Nix v. Williams decision. In Nix the Court recognized, without
any prompting from higher courts, that “the ‘vast majority’ of all courts,
both state and federal, recognize[d] an inevitable discovery exception to
the exclusionary rule.” 295 Local courts, on their own initiative, carved
out an exception. They broke from Mapp because they did not feel that
the goals of Mapp would be served. 296
If I might, I would like to turn to the rationale that gave rise to the
exclusionary rule. As I’ve set forth in my brief, our society pays a
tremendous price for the rule—this price mandates that the reason behind
the rule be sound. Now, despite the protestations of Mr. Bishop, the

whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons who are
the victims of illegal but fruitless searches.”).
295. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440 (1984).
296. See United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding that
illegally obtained evidence was properly admitted because the police would have learned of the
information regardless of the illegality); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(relying on the Court’s attenuation of the taint doctrine in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963), and the fact that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered in holding that the
exclusionary rule’s application was not warranted).
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reason for the exclusionary rule is, and has always been, to deter the
police from future violations of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice May: That’s correct, Counsel, and for the police—these
advocates of law and order—to have evidence of guilt excluded is a great
disincentive to violate the rules of search and seizure.
Prosecutor: With all due respect, Justice May, I disagree. I will
acknowledge, however, that the police are advocates in the criminal
justice system and that they rightfully see themselves pitted against
criminals. 297 Moreover, one of the ways to succeed in that struggle is not
only to make arrests but also obtain convictions. I believe, however, that
there is a serious disconnect between arrest and conviction. From my
understanding of police behavior, it appears that once the police make an
arrest and gather evidence they feel their job is done. 298 From that point
forward they feel powerless, and if evidence is excluded or convictions
are not forthcoming, they feel that is due to the vagaries of the rules of
search and seizure, as well as the actions of the lawyers and judges
involved. 299 This feeling of powerlessness is exacerbated because often
the officers that are involved are not even informed whether evidence has
been suppressed. 300 Because of that disconnect, the operation of the rule
works only in an indirect way on the police.

297. See supra notes 273–74 and accompanying text.
298. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954) (“The case is made, so far as the police
are concerned, when they announce that they have arrested their man.”).
299. Id. at 147 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Police feel powerless because they do not have a
mechanical process by which to adhere. Rather, police arrests often depend upon the actions of
judges and lawyers and how they interpret the rules of search and seizure on a case-by-case basis.
Frankfurter stated the following:
Since due process is not a mechanical yardstick, it does not afford mechanical answers. In
applying the Due Process Clause judicial judgment is involved in an empiric process in
the sense that results are not predetermined or mechanically ascertainable. But that is a
very different thing from conceiving the results as ad hoc decisions in the opprobrious
sense of ad hoc. Empiricism implies judgment upon variant situations by the wisdom of
experience. Ad hocness in adjudication means treating a particular case by itself and not
in relation to the meaning of a course of decisions and the guides they serve for the
future. There is all the difference in the world between disposing of a case as though it
were a discrete instance and recognizing it as part of the process of judgment, taking its
place in relation to what went before and further cutting a channel for what is to come.
Id.
300. See Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 722–25 (“If the exclusionary rule is to have any
specific deterrent effect, the offending officers must be apprised of the ruling and the reasons for
it.”). As evidenced by the Ventura County study, police officers rarely received any formal
communication concerning the outcome of the suppression hearing and “instead frequently learned
of the ruling only if the officer happened to be in court when the ruling was announced.” Id.
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Justice May: Excuse me, Counsel, but I noted your reference to
various studies in your brief, and I am skeptical that anyone can produce
definitive information about whether officers do or do not care about
evidence being excluded and convictions being lost. My common sense
tells me that it does matter, that the officers do care what happens. And if
they do care, and evidence is excluded and perhaps an otherwise guilty
person walks free, that will be a reason for the officer to better perform
his job the next time around.
Prosecutor: Justice May, the empirical data does not support your
conclusion. While acknowledging that testing in such a complex arena is
difficult and may well have a subjective component, it is the best
evidence we have for evaluating the effects of the rule. But as I was
about to say, for the police to be truly motivated to not violate the laws of
search and seizure, there must be a more direct method of getting their
attention and requiring them to do their jobs within the law. 301
Justice May: Counsel, I am very concerned with relying on the
“findings” of these studies that by your own account contain a level of
subjectiveness. But let’s agree to disagree on that and turn to this
business of direct sanctions. I’m worried about the chilling effect this
would have on our officers. Wouldn’t we be creating a situation where
police officers, concerned that they may be fined, suspended, or even
fired, will be less effective in how they go about their jobs?
Prosecutor: There is no question in my mind that if an officer faces
the possibility of being monetarily sanctioned, he will have a greater
incentive to do his job within the law. But I will not agree that he will be
compromised or somehow less effective in going about his job. Let’s
step back a moment. Being a police officer in our complicated society is
a demanding job. It requires courage as well as knowledge. We demand a
lot of our cops, but we do not demand more than what they are capable
of. We hire men and women who we believe will be courageous, and we
train them so that they will be knowledgeable. All we are asking is that
they do the job they were hired and trained to do.

301. See Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 683. Heffernan and Lovely believed that “direct
sanctions against offending officers would trigger doubts about police intrusions that were legal,
thus inhibiting vigorous law enforcement and bringing about uncertainty and inaction on the part of
the police.” Id. Thus, they concluded that indirect sanctions were sufficient to deter illegal police
misconduct; “[h]owever, despite the authors’ conclusions, the large number of unwitting violators
(34%) shows the extent to which the rule can not operate as a deterrent. There can be no deterrence
in the absence of police understanding the law.” Id.
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Justice May: What if they are in a difficult position and the path or
correct course of conduct is not readily apparent? Given the possibility of
sanction, won’t they be more likely to step back instead of going ahead
and doing their job?
Prosecutor: If the course of conduct is not clear, perhaps we are
better served if they step back. I don’t see that as compromising; I see
that as an officer doing his job right.
Justice Harris: Following along the same lines, the problem I see
with direct sanctions is policy perjury. Some of the studies you rely on
mention that police perjury is a problem under the current rule, which
you maintain offers only an indirect sanction. If we institute a more
direct sanction aren’t we opening the door to even more police perjury?
Prosecutor: I, too, am concerned about police perjury; and yes, I
agree with your concern that this more direct sanction may well increase
the instances of perjury.
Justice May: Are you conceding that police perjury will become
more prevalent with more direct sanction?
Prosecutor: It may, although I have no way of knowing. Intuitively
it seems that may be an adverse result. But I do know that we already
have some police perjury—none of us can know to what extent—and
what I also know is that it would be far better to stomach some additional
instances of police perjury rather than continuing to exclude highly
probative and incriminating evidence of guilt.
Justice May: Ms. Alper, your comment begs the question and
introduces some gratuitous grandstanding into the argument.
Prosecutor: I am willing to concede that one of the consequences of
my position may be more police perjury, but I disagree that my comment
was gratuitous. What this court must do is weigh the competing
advantages and disadvantages of either staying the course and resorting
once again to the tried and failed exclusion approach or setting forth on
an alternative path that may well deter the police from future violations
while admitting probative evidence of guilt.
Justice Brandeis praised our federal system of government because it
allowed the states autonomy within the larger system to experiment with
new ideas. This states-as-laboratories idea has been successful in
implementing unemployment compensation, minimum-wage laws,
public financing of political campaigns, and prohibitions against
discrimination in housing and employment. 302 Why not here? Are we so
302. See supra note 213.
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taken with the exclusionary rule that we won’t even consider some other
way of enforcing and protecting the Fourth Amendment.
The proposal I set forth may create more police perjury, prove to
have too much of a chilling effect on the police, or have other unforeseen
consequences. None of us will know until we try it.
Justice May: Counsel, your comments suggest to me that you are
willing to open a Pandora’s Box of both foreseeable and unforeseeable
potential problems. Given the uncertainties, would it even be responsible
to take the action you propose?
Prosecutor: Justice May, I don’t pretend to have all the answers. I
do know that the detective in this case will be in a better position to
follow the Fourth Amendment the next time he is confronted with a
search and seizure situation. I also know that excluding the evidence of
Mr. Johnson’s meth lab will serve no purpose whatsoever except to allow
a dope manufacturer and dealer to be returned to the streets to go about
his illegal business.
Justice McPeak: I suspect you are right about this detective in this
case, but I am disturbed that in the next case, or the one after that, in an
attempt to avoid exclusion the effected police agency may discipline its
offending officer simply to get around exclusion. What I mean to say is
that the department is not really interested in deterrence but only in
avoiding exclusion of the evidence. I’m concerned about police agency
manipulation.
Prosecutor: That’s why it is necessary that the judge at the
suppression hearing be convinced that the efforts undertaken by the
agency are genuine and undertaken with deterrence as the goal before
admitting the evidence.
Justice McPeak: Well, then aren’t we putting tremendous power in
the hands of the judge to evaluate departmental policy?
Prosecutor: Only as it relates to the actions undertaken with regard
to the involved officers.
Justice McPeak: I foresee potential problems when a police agency
brings pressure to bear on a judge in a particularly volatile case.
Prosecutor: I would suggest that a judge forced to exclude highly
incriminating evidence because of police error is already under
tremendous pressure under the current rule.
Justice Harris: Ms. Alper, one of the time honored criticisms of the
exclusionary rule is that these persons whose Fourth Amendment rights
were violated, but whose cases were never filed, have no practical
redress. Does your proposal affect those cases?
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Prosecutor: No it does not. Although in preparing for my argument
here today, I have come across a number of thoughtful and practical
approaches that address your concern. However, unlike what I propose in
this instance, those approaches would require legislative action. One
proposal in particular set forth a civil administrative remedy modeled
after the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which creates
civil administrative remedies for discriminatory housing or employment
practices. 303
But, again, that would require legislative action and is far beyond
what I am seeking from this court in this case.
Justice Harris: I see your time has expired, Ms. Alper, but I can’t
get over my lingering concern that what you are seeking is beyond our
authority. The exclusionary rule was a creation of the United States
Supreme Court; who are we to act in defiance?
Prosecutor: May I respond?
Justice Harris: Go ahead.
Prosecutor: Far from acting in defiance, I believe this court would
be acting in accord with Supreme Court precedent. First, the Court has
never said exclusion was the sole remedy. 304 Second, just as the Court in
the recent Patane opinion ruled that exclusion was not appropriate when
the violation stemmed from Fifth Amendment error, exclusion is only
appropriate when it fulfills the goal of deterrence from Fourth
Amendment violation. 305 In this instance there is no reason to exclude
this evidence.
Thank you for your time.
Justice Harris: Well, on behalf of Justice May and Justice McPeak,
I would like to thank both Defense Counsel Bishop and Prosecutor Alper
for arguments well made. There are timeliness issues with this case, so
you can expect our opinion within the week.
V. CONCLUSION
The arguments have been made. The lines have been carefully
drawn. The prosecutor’s bold proposal that exclusion is not necessary
303. See Perrin et al., supra note 11, at 743–55 (proposing that the exclusionary rule be limited
in scope to apply only to evidence obtained because of intentional or willful police misconduct, and
that those individuals who have evidence seized as a result of reckless, negligent, or innocent
conduct have access to a civil administrative process that would include the availability of monetary
recovery from the offending officers or their employer).
304. See supra notes 92, 250, and 252.
305. See supra notes 126 and 252.
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even in the face of clear Fourth Amendment error has been examined
from every side. Will it prevail?
Is this such a far fetched scenario? The Court has indeed left the door
open. And if we are convinced that this very costly exclusionary rule is
not accomplishing what it was designed for, can we not move beyond it?
Perhaps a bold and innovative prosecutor supported by her office can
push her initiative on a trial judge. Perhaps a trial judge, running the risk
of appellate rebuke, can pick up the challenge and carry it forward. Is it
not time to push past the tried and frustrating course that continues to
carve out exception after exception in order to avoid the rule’s draconian
effect? Is it not time to heed Justice Blackmun’s words and recognize
that “the exclusionary rule is subject to change in light of changing
judicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the confines
of the courtroom”? 306 Is it not time to put into action Brandeis’ theory
“that a single courageous State may, if its citizen’s choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments”? 307 Is it not
time?

306. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
307. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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